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I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 1999, a federal jury in Oregon punished the
authors of a web site with a judgment exceeding $100 million for
writing provocative anti-abortion invectives.' The previous spring, the
United States Supreme Court let stand a federal judge's bizarre perpetual gag order forbidding former jurors from speaking to the media
ever - about their jury deliberations, absent special permission
from the judge herself.' In 1998, a state judge ordered a Greenville,
Mississippi, newspaper reporter arrested and charged her with criminal contempt for disobeying the judge's order by publishing the juvenile record of a criminal defendant, even after the defendant's recPartner, Sills Cummis Radin Tischman Epstein & Gross, P.C., Newark,
New
Jersey; Adjunct Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, 1989 to present; A.B., Princeton University, 1972; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1975; Judge of
the Superior Court of NewJersey, 1987-1995.
The author wishes to thankJames C. Sheil, Seton Hall University School of Law,
class of 1999, whose extraordinary talents as a research assistant constructed, guided,
and fortified this Article, and Mark V. Tushnet, Associate Dean for Research and
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law
Center, whose comments on the text of this Article were insightful, challenging, and
greatly helpful.
See Jury Finds Web Site Threatened Doctors Who Perform Abortions, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Feb. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories; see also infra notes 23746 and accompanying text (discussing further the "Nuremberg Files" verdict).
2 See United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.
Ct. 1518 (1998); Ellen Alderman, GaggingJurors -After the Trial,COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., May 1998, at 45 (calling the gag order issued in United States v. Cleveland
"highly unusual" and a "surreal solution" to a "real problem," and arguing that the
order is likely to produce "oddball" and "somewhat comical" results such as elevating
a trial judge to the level of "super-editor" who would "review[] questions in advance"
before journalists may speak with jurors even after a case is concluded); see also infra
notes 247-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Louisiana gag order).
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ord was read aloud in an open courtroom during sentencing.3 In
1997, a federal district court judge ordered a Wilmington, North
Carolina, newspaper and its bureau chief to pay more than $600,000
for publishingthe truthful details of a secret environmental pollution
settlement, although the bureau chief had received the information
from the case file supplied by a court clerk, who had given the information to her in error. In a rare case in which ajudge's clamp on
free speech actually hurt government prosecutors rather than the
public or criminal defendants, the federal judge handling the Oklahoma City bombing case issued and enforced a gag order forbidding
federal prosecutors from communicating in public or in private with
state prosecutors regarding the case, for months beyond the conclusion of the trial.5 And in a first for pop music, in the traditional civil
liberties stronghold of northern California, an up-and-coming rap
music artist was arrested and jailed for singing angry political lyrics
6
that were less than kind to the traditional
target
of rebellious youthauthorities.
enforcement
law
oriented music:
As the twentieth century draws to a close and Americans contemplate the countless victories won for freedom during the past one
hundred years, freedom of speech, the quintessential American civil
liberty, has come under fire from the most unlikely of sources: the
judiciary - the traditional defender of individual liberties against the
censuring potential of government authorities. First Amendment
liberties are under assault in ways that seemed virtually impossible
just a few years ago. It is particularly shocking that these judicially
enforced sanctions amount to restrictions on the content of speech,
not merely time, place, and manner regulations. Civil libertarians
may wonder if this is America at the close of the twentieth century, or
if this is George Orwell's 1984.
These and many other cases that have reached the courts in the
past two decades demonstrate a waning commitment by courts to act
See Jane Kirtley, Competing Interests, Assaults on Access Rights Keep Coming as
Judges Continue to be Obstacles, QUILL, Sept. 1, 1998, at 24; see also infra notes 266-68
3

and accompanying text (discussing the case further).
See Kirtley, supra note 3, at 24; see also infra notes 269-72 and accompanying
text (discussing the case further).
See United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. Colo. 1996); see also
infra notes 273-80 and accompanying text (discussing the gag order issued in the
McVeigh case).
6 See Soren Baker, Paroled Rapper's Fighting Words Land Him
Back in Jail, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 6, 1998, at 1 ("California rapper Shawn Thomas... appears to be the
first musician arrested for what he said on a record."); see also infra notes 281-302
and accompanying text (discussing the arrest and parole revocation of the rap art-

ist).
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as the protectors of the speech liberties guaranteed to individuals
and to the media by the First Amendment. The courts only sporadically apply, and frequently ignore, clear and controlling precedent
prohibiting the punishment or preclusion of free and open communication of truthful information lawfully obtained, even in cases that
clearly merit application of such precedent. The strong speechprotective doctrine propounded in a pair of United States Supreme
Court cases, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing and Florida Star v. BJ.F.,9
prohibits the government from impairing such First Amendment liberties absent "a need to further a state interest of the highest order."
This doctrine clearly places the onus on the government to come
forward with an exceedingly persuasive need in order to interfere
with an individual's expressive liberties.
Why is this doctrine overlooked when a parole officer decides to
have a rap artist arrested because the officer disapproves of the content
of the singer's message? Where is this strong protection for the individual when blameless news reporters are arrested or fined for publishing the truth merely because litigants and a judge object to the
publication of lawfully obtained information? Is a state interest of
the highest order being served when a judge denies jurors the right
to speak about their experiences, cuts off the media's access to willing
speakers, or forbids communication among prosecutors long after
the judge's control over these participants in the court system has
terminated?
Far too often, lower federal and state courts are failing properly
to apply the Supreme Court's state interest of the highest order doctrine and, thus, are failing to follow precedent that strongly protects
individual civil liberties, particularly in the First Amendment context.
Part of this dearth of application of the state interest of the highest
order doctrine may stem from the confusion of lower courts when it
comes to the application of the doctrine. Many courts confuse the
doctrine with traditional strict scrutiny" and, because strict scrutiny is

7 See U.S. CONSr. amend I. The full text of the First Amendment to the
United
States Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." Id.
8 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
9 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
10

FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 541; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTUrIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451 (2d ed.

1988) (explaining strict scrutiny review).
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2
often viewed as fatal to the governmental action under review,
choose not to apply the doctrine. Other courts apply the doctrine as
if it were a mere balancing test, thereby according too little power to
the doctrine and granting too much leeway to the government when
it interferes with civil liberties. And far too many courts are hesitant
to apply the state interest of the highest order doctrine beyond cases
that are factually similar to Daily Mail and FloridaStar, thereby failing
to follow the Supreme Court's suggestion that the doctrine can be
applied in a much broader array of civil liberties scenarios.
This Article explores the somewhat amorphous doctrine of state
interest of the highest order first raised by United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in the landmark First Amendment free exercise of religion opinion Wisconsin v. Yoder.5 Justice
Thurgood Marshall invoked the doctrine again in his powerful dissent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke."1 The Court applied state interest of the highest order as the definitive protection of
the media from punishment for publishing truthful information lawfully obtained in Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Florida Star.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has since applied the doctrine in
opinions covering factually diverse situations.
Part II of this Article explores the evolution of the doctrine from
its genesis in Yoder through its apotheosis as the majority's rule in
Daily Mail and F/oridaStar. Part III breaks down the doctrine into its
component parts in an effort to ascertain the meaning of "state interest of the highest order" by analyzing what interests have been found
sufficient and insufficient to meet the doctrine's standards and by
scrutinizing the requirements of the doctrine's narrow tailoring
prong. Part IV chronicles the often inconsistent efforts of lower
courts to apply the state interest of the highest order doctrine, which
has been invoked as a variant on the rational basis test and as a
euphemism for traditional strict scrutiny. Part IV also outlines a
number of lower court decisions that prescribe the proper application of the doctrine as a strong due process standard to protect civil
liberties, and discusses opinions of the Supreme Court that suggest
ways in which the doctrine should be extended to safeguard First
Amendment liberties. Part V explores the somewhat erratic jurisprudence and varying standards applied to justify restrictions on First
Amendment speech in the courtroom in order to serve the govern-

12 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(characterizing strict scrutiny review as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
Is 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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ment's interest in justice. Part VI explores in greater detail the recent unsettling court-enforced speech restrictions discussed above
and contends that such decisions are unjustifiable intrusions on fundamental speech liberties protected by the First Amendment. Part VI
also proposes, following the F/orida Star rationale, that government
actors should be held to a single, unifying due process standard requiring a state interest of the highest order and no other means to
serve that interest - before any impairment by the government of the
content of speech may be justified. Part VII concludes that only by
consistently applying the state interest of the highest order doctrine
can courts assure that First Amendment liberties are adequately protected from impairment by any branch of the government.
II.

STATE INTEREST OF THE HIGHEST ORDER: GENESIS AND
EVOLUTION OF A DUE PROCESS STANDARD

The state interest of the highest order doctrine was born and
developed through a series of opinions authored by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Marshall in the 1970s and 1980s. Although neither Justice defined precisely the meaning of the phrase, the manner
in which they invoked and applied the doctrine suggests that they intended it to provide extraordinary protection of First Amendment
liberties by putting a great onus on the government to justify any impairment of expressive liberties and thus requiring the government
to demonstrate a need to further a state interest of the highest order
addressed by the narrowest possible means to serve that interest. The
context in which the doctrine was invoked also strongly suggests that
it was intended as a unifying force to simplify judicial scrutiny of government behavior that implicates expressive liberty interests.
Chief Justice Burger coined the phrase "interests of the highest
order" in the Supreme Court's landmark 1972 decision of Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 5 in which the Court invalidated a state law that required all
children to attend high school despite their parents' strong religionbased aversion to secondary school education. 6 The plaintiffs, Amish
parents, contended that the state's compulsory education law resulted in an impairment of their constitutionally secured right to the
free exercise of religion. 7 The Chief Justice, in writing that the law
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
17
See id. at 20809. The plaintiffs invoked the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause as a bar to state-required secondary school education. See id. The Amish
parents were charged, tried, and convicted of breaking the state's mandatory education law and were fined five dollars each as a result. See id. at 208. They contended
15
16
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was unconstitutional, explained that only "interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion."'
The Court conceded that the interest in assuring public education of the young was a legitimate and substantial interest - one of
"paramount responsibility" that "ranks at the very apex of the function of a State," yet the Court stopped short of declaring that interest
to be one of the highest order.' Suggesting the magnitude that would
be required before a state interest could trump free exercise of religion rights, the Court declared that "however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to
the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. '0
The Court found that the state's interest in education was already adequately served by requiring Amish youngsters to attend
school through the eighth grade and allowing their further education to be assured through home schooling and vocational training
within the Amish community, such that the children would be adequately educated and trained to become successful participants in
their community.2' Thus, the Court did not actually decide the magnitude of the state's asserted interest in education, but based its decision on a finding that the interest in education was "otherwise
served" by allowing Amish teenagers to receive vocational education
at home and within the Amish community.
The language used in Yoder suggests that the First Amendment
erects a powerful bar to state action that impairs the free exercise of
religion even when the state's intentions are salutary, noble, and vital." The state must show not only that it has a paramount interest
at trial that forcing their children to attend high school offended their religious
practices, which included home schooling and hands-on vocational education in the
Amish community. See id. at 209-10. The insular Amish community maintained a
separate existence from mainstream society and believed that this separateness was
essential to their way of life, to practicing their faith, and to their salvation. See id. at
210.
Is Id. at 215. The Court did not speak in terms of strict scrutiny or "compelling
state interests." Rather, it announced a new standard for heightened scrutiny of
governmental actions that impair the free exercise of religion and the prerogatives
of parenthood. See id.
'. See id. at 213,
215.
0 Id. at 215.
21 See id. at 236.
2
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236.
23 See id. at 220-21. The Court recognized the right and
obligation of the state to
exercise its police power where needed to assure the safety, health, and general welfare of the citizenry, but qualified that "there are areas of conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the
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that must be served regardless of any resulting impairment of religious liberty, but it must also demonstrate that it has no option but to
impair religious liberty in order to serve that interest.
It is significant to note that Chief Justice Burger cited no authority for the state "interests of the highest order" standard he invoked. 4
Rather, he applied the terminology after having cited several of the
Supreme Court's landmark cases addressing the religion clauses of
the First Amendment. 5 The Chief Justice synthesized the various
standards applied in the Court's religion clauses precedents into a
sole, unified precept represented by the state interest of the highest
order doctrine, stating: "The essence of all that has been said and
written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion.2 6 The Chief Justice clearly intended
this standard to draw in and apply the spirit of those prior religion
clauses cases and to simplify the analysis by putting the onus on the
state to justify its impairment of protected liberties through demonstrating a state interest of the highest order that cannot be otherwise
served without impacting a constitutional liberty.
The phrase "state interest of the highest order" was invoked in
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 7 In Bakke, the Court invalidated a state university
medical school's special minority set-aside admissions program that
assured that seats in each entering class were reserved for minority
students.

28

The Court examined the state's admissions policy under

State to control, even under regulations of general applicability." Id. at 220. Regarding such laws of general applicability, the Court noted that a "regulation neutral
on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id.
The Court also rejected the state's assertion that its interest in assuring education of
all youngsters until the age of 16 was "so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give way." Id. at 221. Because "fundamental claims
of religious freedom" were implicated, the Court said it "cannot accept such a
sweeping claim" by the state and must instead "searchingly examine the interests
that the State seeks to promote by its requirement ... and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption." Id.
24 See id. at
215.
25 See id. at 214-15 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
26 Id. at 215.
27 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
28 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272.
Bakke, a white male, sought a declaration that the
University of California at Davis's medical school admission procedure, which reserved 16 out of 100 seats for minority applicants, was a constitutionally invalid denial of equal protection of the laws after he was denied admission to the medical
school. See id. at 276-79. The trial court declared the university's admission practice
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strict scrutiny because the program made distinctions based on race
and, therefore, was "inherently suspect."' 9 The Court concluded that
the university may consider the race of an applicant only as one of a
number of factors considered in the admissions process, but not as
the sole factor determining any applicant's acceptance or rejection
for a seat in an incoming class."0
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court was incorrect in applying strict scrutiny to the university's admissions policy
aimed at eradicating racial discrimination against minorities."
Rather, the Justice argued that the university's policy should be analyzed under a slightly more deferential standard, akin to intermediate
scrutiny, because of the remedial nature of the policy and the magnitude of the state's interest in erasing the nation's sorry history of governmental discrimination against Mrican-Americans.
Characterizing that interest, Justice Marshall asserted that
[i]n light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating
impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the highest
order. To fail to do so3 is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society.'

Because of the highest order magnitude of that state interest at
stake, Justice Marshall believed that a race-conscious admissions pol-

invalid, but did not require Bakke's admission. See id. at 279. The California Supreme Court affirmed, but ordered the university to admit Bakke. See id. at 279-81.
29
See id. at 291 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
30 See id. at 314-20. The majority recognized that diversity of the student body
was a compelling interest, but ruled that the exclusion of Bakke due to the special
admissions program was not necessary to achieve diversity. See id.The Court also
ordered that Bakke be admitted because the university could not show that absent
the special admissions program, Bakke would not have been admitted. See id. at 320.
51 See id. at 396-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall recapped the history of official racial discrimination against blacks in the United States, from the days
of slavery through the post-Reconstruction period, and up to the segregation of
schools and public accommodations that lasted until the 1960s. See id.at 387-96
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The Justice remarked that the Equal Protection Clause
was placed in the Constitution to combat the pernicious history of racial discrimination in America, not to prevent efforts to eradicate it through affirmative action. See
id. at 396 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to accept
that fate. Neither its history nor our past cases lend any support to the
conclusion that a [state-owned] university may not remedy the cumulative effects of society's discrimination by giving consideration to race in
an effort to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors.
Id.
32
See id. at 398-400 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
33Id. at 396 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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icy should be upheld under intermediate scrutiny, thus surviving an
equal protection attack under the Fourteenth Amendment.3'
From the context in which the phrase is used, it seems that Justice Marshall believed that government should make the uplifting of
blacks to a level equal to that of whites a paramount state priority.
To serve that paramount interest - a state interest of the highest order - then, the Justice would tolerate impairment of liberties such as
the equal protection rights of whites.
The state interest of the highest order doctrine has seen its
strongest application in cases involving efforts to sanction the media
for disseminating sensitive information that the state endeavored to
keep secret. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,35 another opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court invoked the doctrine to
nullify a state's effort to punish a newspaper for publishing the name
of a juvenile offender.6 For the first time in the free speech context,
the Court promulgated the doctrine that the state may not punish
the publication of lawfully obtained truthful information "absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order.,3 7 The Court
found that the state's interest in protecting the confidentiality of ajuvenile offender and thereby fostering rehabilitation was "not sufficient to justify application of a criminal penalty" to the mediass In
addition, the Court found that the state's chosen means of assuring
its stated interest were constitutionally impermissible because the
statute restricted its penal reach to print media and did not restrict
the publication of the juvenile offender's name by the electronic
media.3 9 In sum, the Court concluded that "even assuming the statute served a state interest of the highest order, it does not accomplish
its stated purpose.,,4
Interestingly, the Chief Justice did not cite his own prior invocation of the highest order language in Yoder, nor did he refer to Justice Marshall's dissent in Bakke. Rather, much like the analytical
framework he employed in Yoder, the Chief Justice reviewed several
cases tangentially related to the issue and synthesized from those
cases as a general precept the jurisprudential conclusion that the
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
s5 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
s6 See id. at 102.
37

Id. at 103.

M Id. at 104.
39 See id. at 104-05.
In fact, three radio stations had already broadcast the name
of the suspected juvenile offender before the Daily Mail published the name. See id.
at 105.
4
Id. at 105.
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state's action was constitutionally impermissible unless it was directed
toward serving a state interest of the highest order.4 ' After reviewing
cases that invalidated state efforts to sanction the media's publication
of information relating to judicial misconduct hearings, 2 a rape victim's identity,' and a juvenile offender's name after it had been revealed in an open public hearing, the Chief Justice announced the
general rule as follows: "None of these opinions directly controls this
case; however, all suggest strongly that if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the informa45
tion, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.
This mode of analysis is clearly reminiscent of the Chief Justice's
prior analytic framework employed in deciding Yoder. In Yoder, the
ChiefJustice similarly cited a litany of cases that had come before and
distilled their essential meaning into a single, unified standard that
required the state to demonstrate a need to further a state interest of
the highest order before it may justify impairing a constitutionally
protected liberty.46 While Daily Mail may fail to cite Yoder as its
predecessor, the Chief Justice employed an identical approach to
analyzing the relevant precedents in both cases and in each case invoked the state interest of the highest order doctrine as the unifying
standard that incorporated the essence of the relevant case law. Daily
Mail, and the unifying state interest of the highest order standard it
invoked, is clearly the jurisprudential progeny of Yoder. The rule announced in the two cases is identical and it accomplishes the same
function: it raises the bar that the state must meet in order to justify
any impairment of constitutionally protected expressive liberties.
The strong protection afforded the media under the Daily Mail
rule was reaffirmed a decade later in another opinion written by Justice Marshall. In his majority opinion in Florida Star v. B.JF,4 7 Justice
Marshall noted that "where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be im-

41

42

See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
See id. at 102 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,

838 (1978)).
4

See id. at 102-03 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975)).
See id. at 103 (citing Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308

(1977)).

Id. at 103.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing ChiefJustice Burger's
analytic framework leading up to the enunciation of the highest order standard in
45

46

Yoder).
47

491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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posed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the
highest order .... ,,48 At issue in Florida Star was a state statute that
imposed criminal liability on the media for publishing the name of a
rape victim. ' 9 The Court questioned the legitimacy of the state's asserted interest in protecting the anonymity of a rape victim, but
based its decision invalidating application of the statute on its facial
under-inclusiveness, since by punishing only media publication of the
victim's name and not all other publications of it, such as word of
mouth, the statute did not serve its own ends.5 The Court also noted
that the state clearly had alternative means to serve its stated purpose,
since it was the state's own failure to police itself properly that led to
the release of the sensitive information to the media.5' Justice Marshall explained that allowing the state to punish the media for publishing certain truthful information could foster timidity and selfcensorship by the media and impose an "onerous" obligation of requiring the media to sift through information released by the government to assure that nothing "arguably unlawful" is mixed in with
the information released.52
Yoder, Daily Mail, and F/orida Star all apply the state interest of
the highest order standard as a strong protection of expressive liberties against governmental regulations that curtail those liberties. But
none of these cases defines precisely the meaning of the doctrine,
except through negative implication. Yoder states that the government's interest in compulsory education is not of a sufficiently high
order to trump an individual's right to the free exercise of religious
liberty. Daily Mail and Florida Star state that the government's interests in confidentiality of the names ofjuvenile offenders and rape victims are not sufficient interests to override the freedom of the press,
and that even if they were, the statutes at issue were not adequately
tailored to serve the state's interests so as to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.

Id. at 541.
See id. at 524. The Florida Star published the victim's full name in its weekly
police blotter section after a sheriffs department had improperly released the name
to the media in the form of an incident report describing the assault. See id.at 527.
The newspaper sent a reporter-trainee to retrieve the police blotter information and
the reporter wrote up the information fully identifying the victim. See id. Although
the newspaper had an internal policy against publishing the names of sexual assault
victims, it did not edit out the identifying information and it published an article
48
49

bearing the victim's full name. See id. at 528.
5
See id. at 541.
51 See id. at 534-35.
s See id. at 535-36.
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Both the Daily Mail and Florida Star Courts stressed that they
were resolving narrow issues based on the facts before them, thus it is
not surprising that the cases do not promulgate a broad rule or give
helpful examples of what order of state concerns would qualify as interests of the highest order sufficient to justify impairment of First
Amendment liberties. 3 Justice Marshall's dissent in Bakke suggests
only what one state interest of the highest order could be, a view with
which a majority of the Court eventually agreed in the context of
public accommodations laws intended to eradicate discrimination. '
Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall applied this terminology in rendering decisive judgments in the cases before them,
neither defined precisely the ambit of the doctrine's reach and
meaning.5
In Yoder, Daily Mail, and Florida Star, the Justices writing the majority opinions concluded that the asserted state interests were not
interests of the highest order sufficient to justify impairment of protected expressive liberties. Yet beyond proclaiming that the governSee Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
105-06 (1979). The FloridaStar Court stated:
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication
is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of
personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual
from intrusion by the press, or even that the State may never punish
publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. We hold only
that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order, and that
no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing liability ... under
the facts of this case.
FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 541. The Daily Mail Court explained:
Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue before us of unlawful press access to confidential judicial proceedings; there is no issue here of privacy or prejudicial pretrial publicity. At issue is simply
the power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal
sanctions on this type of publication.
Daily Mai 443 U.S. at 105-06.
See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing Roberts v. United
StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and its progeny).
55 See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 480 (Cal. 1998). The
court lamented:
[T]he Florida Star decision provides little general guidance as to what
is, and is not, "a matter of public significance" - what is newsworthy,
in other words - or as to when, if ever, the protection of private facts
against public disclosure should be considered a sufficiently important
state interest to justify civil liability pursuant to the common law tort.
5s
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ment's interests in education and protecting the privacy of juvenile
offenders and rape victims did not meet the doctrine's standards, the
Justices offered little in the way of instructive guidelines by which to
gauge just what governmental interests are of such vitality as to qualify as state interests of the highest order.
III. FLESHING OUT THE STANDARD: CASE LAW APPLICATION
ENDEAVORS TO DEFINE THE DOCTRINE

A.

State Interests of the Highest Order: What They Are Not

An effort to put meat on the bare bones of the phrase "state interest of the highest order" requires an eye for jurisprudential implication and an ear for negative inferences. The jurisprudence of the
state interest of the highest order doctrine has often produced a
clearer picture of what a state interest of the highest order is not,
rather than what it is.
Courts applying the state interest of the highest order doctrine
have, like the Yoder and FloridaStar Courts, provided negative definitions of the doctrine by declaring what governmental interests do not
meet its standards. Protecting the integrity of the judiciary from false
allegations 6 and preserving the confidentiality of attorney misconduct hearings involving judges and lawyers,57 for example, are not

56 See Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm., 748 F. Supp.
1520, 1528
(S.D. Fla. 1990). The plaintiff in this case filed a complaint under the fictitious
name "Doe" with the FloridaJudicial Qualifications Committee (FJQC) after he observed a judge openly discriminate against a person diagnosed with AIDS. See id. at
1522. The FJQC informed Doe that, pursuant to the Florida Constitution, the fact
that the complaint was filed against a judge made it confidential. See id. Doe
brought suit for a determination of whether the constitutional provision in question
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. at 1523. The federal district court invalidated the confidentiality
requirement of the Florida Constitution, noting that it was not a valid time, place,
and manner restriction on speech, and found that the state's interest in protecting
judges was not compelling enough to support the provision. See id. at 1525, 1529.
The court found that the provision was overbroad because it applied to truthful
complaints as well as to false ones. See id. at 1527. Citing Florida Star, the court declared that the FJQC could only support the provision by demonstrating a "state interest of the highest order." Id. at 1528; see also Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624,
632 (1990) ("The publication of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct.., has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First
Amendment."); Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978)
(finding that the publication of information about judicial disciplinary proceedings
"lies near the core of the First Amendment").
57 See Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230, 1235-36 (Mont. 1993),
overruled by Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (1995). In Lence, a
newspaper printed a story about the Montana Supreme Court's probe into allega-
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state interests of the highest order sufficient to warrant closing all
misconduct proceedings and impairing the public's and the media's
First Amendment interests. Additionally, the justice system's interests
in managing litigation and preserving a confidentiality agreement
regarding pretrial materials are not state interests of the highest order sufficient to bar the litigants' disclosure of information obtained
independent from the discovery process."
Because Daily Mail and Florida Star concerned the media's right
to publish truthful information lawfully obtained, much of the case
law applying the state interest of the highest order doctrine has addressed the tension between the state's interest in restricting the flow
of information it described as potentially harmful and the media's
right to report information it deemed to be newsworthy. Courts have
usually found that the asserted state interests were not great enough
to trump the public's and the media's First Amendment rights to acquire and disseminate newsworthy information.
Among the governmental interests found not to rise to the level
of a state interest of the highest order in this state-versus-the-media
context are: compensating for the emotional distress caused by an
inaccurate media report, 9 authorizing the selective prohibition of
tions of fraud against an attorney, as well as a story regarding the summons issued to
him for a violation of a building code. See id. at 1232-33. Lence sued, claiming that
the newspaper intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress. See id. at
1232.
Quoting Florida Star, the Montana Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment shields the press from liability for publishing truthful information because the public's interest in learning about alleged attorney misconduct outweighed the state's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the attorney misconduct commission's investigation. See id. at 1236, 1239.
See In re PEPCO Employment Litig., No. 86-0603, 1992 WL 115611, at *8
(D.D.C. May 8, 1992) (finding that a court cannot prevent disclosure of information
obtained from outside sources "absent a compelling state interest of the highest order").
59 See Upchurch v. New York Times Co., 431 S.E.2d 558, 562 (S.C.
1993). The
dispute in Upchurch stemmed from a newspaper report that police suspected a local
resident's death was due to cocaine use. See id. at 560. Survivors of the decedent
brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the trial court
held that the newspaper enjoyed First Amendment immunity from such suits. See id.
The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's finding of absolute press immunity based on the First Amendment, but held that the paper was
protected from liability in this instance. See id. at 561-62. Citing Florida Star, the
court stated that "when a newspaper (1) lawfully obtains (2) truthful information
about (3) a matter of public significance, liability may be imposed only if it serves a
need to further a state interest of the highest order." Id. at 561 (citing Florida Star,
491 U.S. at 536-37). But see Miller v. National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 685
(Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the media's potential liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress stemming from its lack of sensitivity in filming and broadcasting the dying moments of a man's life without regard to the decedent wife's protestations was ajury question).
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indecent speech, 60 securing a public accident scene when a news photographer's presence would not interfere with police activity, 61 protecting the confidentiality of a rape victim's name,62 protecting the
60 See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1993),
judgment vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). The Alliance for Community Media, a group of cable programmers, challenged an FCC order regulating indecent programming on cable access channels. See id. at 814. The court held that
the First Amendment neither permits the government to ban indecent programming nor allows it to empower cable operators to effect such a ban. See id. at 831.
The court found that the Cable Communications Policy Act was under-inclusive because it prohibited indecent programming on leased channels while it failed to
regulate commercial channels. See id. at 828-29. The court analogized the FCC's
restrictions, which forced private cable operators to abdicate editorial control over
cable access channels, to Florida Star- insofar as it considered the regulation to be a
content-based regulation that it selectively applied to some speech while failing to
consider others, thus punishing the cable operators while leaving similarly situated
broadcasters alone. See id. at 826-27. The court concluded that the government may
not do so absent a state interest of the highest order. See id. On rehearing, an en
banc panel of the District of Columbia Circuit sustained the Act's provisions. See 56
F.3d 105, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
61 See Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990) (finding
that a public accident scene did not present the type of sensitive criminal information warranting safeguarding from public inspection and that the government may
impair the media's news gathering "'only when narrowly tailored to a state interest
of the highest order"') (quoting Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541). In addition to its asserted interests in securing a crime scene, the Town of Hudson argued that its prohibition on media access was a justifiable attempt to protect the privacy interests of
the accident victim. See id. The Connell court rejected that claim, noting, "The
Court does not accept defendants' paternalistic views of police authority." Id.
62 See Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 496 S.E.2d 636, 636 (S.C. 1998) (reversing an
appellate court's finding that a jury question existed under Florida Star as to the
newsworthiness of publishing the name of a victim of prison rape); State v. Globe
Communications, 648 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 1994); Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Tatum,
436 S.E.2d 655, 657-58 (Ga. 1993).
In a lawsuit connected to the much-publicized William Kennedy Smith rape
trial, a newspaper was criminally charged with violating a Florida statute that prohibited the release of information identifying a rape victim. See Globe Communications,
648 So. 2d at 111. Unlike the situation in Florida Star, the media here did not obtain
the victim's name from police, but rather through its own investigations.

See id.

Based on the Florida Star standard, the state supreme court held that prosecution of
the media violated the press's freedom of speech under the First Amendment because the statute was not narrowly tailored to advance a state interest of the highest
order. See id. at 112. The state interests asserted -

protecting the privacy and safety

of rape victims and encouraging rape victims to come forward - were determined
not to be weighty enough to justify the automatic imposition of liability on the press
without adopting a fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis. See id. Ironically, strict application of the statute at issue and its automatic liability standard could have resulted
in the prosecution of the rape victim herself because the victim, Patricia Bowman,
publicly announced her identity as soon as the trial was complete in an effort to remove the sense of stigma that she believed stemmed from secretive treatment of her
identity during the highly publicized trial. See Editorial, What's-Her-Name, N.J. L.J.,
Feb. 17, 1992, at 14 (quoting Patricia Bowman announcing her identity and proclaiming, "I am not a blue blob. I'm a person. I have nothing to be ashamed of," in
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privacy of juveniles involved in the courts when identifying information had already been released prior to judicial confidentiality orders,6 keeping secret the names or identities of jurors when the information is otherwise available,6 protecting privacy interests of
reference to the blue graphic CNN television used to mask the victim's face during
trial coverage).
At issue in Macon Telegraph was a state rape shield statute similar to that at issue
in Florida Star, which forbade publication of the name of a sexual assault victim. See
Macon Telegraph, 436 S.E.2d at 657. Tatum had shot and killed an intruder in her
home when he attempted to rape her. See id. The newspaper obtained her name
from the police and ran a story that divulged her name and address. See id. Tatum
sued for invasion of privacy under the rape shield law. See id. The trial court
awarded Tatum damages under a common law privacy tort. See id.The appellate
court affirmed, distinguishing FloridaStar on the grounds that, here, police did not
issue a news release containing Tatum's name, and liability was derived from the
common law tort of invasion of privacy, not based on negligence per se for violation
of Georgia's rape shield statute. See id. The Georgia Supreme Court invalidated the
jury's damage award for Tatum, holding that, under Florida Star,a news organization
that legally receives correct information may not be punished except to advance a
state interest of the highest order. See id. at 657-58; see also Star Telegram Inc. v.
Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (applying the Florida Star state interest of the
highest order standard to conclude that a newspaper's publication of newsworthy
identifying information that did not specifically name the victim was constitutionally
protected and noting that requiring the press to contemplate every instance of burden on victims would have a chilling effect on its ability to inform the public); cf
Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
that a rape victim had no invasion of privacy cause of action against a television station for using her first name and a picture of her home in a television documentary
about rape when the information was newsworthy, but declining to apply Daily Mail
to decide the media's claim of an absolute right to publish truthful information lawfull4 obtained from the public record).
See Jacksonville Television, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs., 659 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing a state interest
of the highest order in protecting the privacy rights of children, but finding that
preventing the release of an interview recorded prior to the issuance of a protective
order was an impermissible prior restraint on speech); In re M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154,
1159-60 (Il. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that although the protection of minors may be
a state interest of the highest order, such interest does not justify imposing a prior
restraint on the media's publication of a child offender's name when the identity
and address of the juvenile had been released prior to the entrance of the court's
protective order). But see In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1057-58 (Ill.
1992)
(upholding a juvenile court's exclusion of a reporter from a juvenile hearing when
the state's proceedings are closed as a rule, and finding that in this circumstance,
the state's interest in protecting the rights of juveniles overrides the press's newsgathering rights under the First Amendment).
See State ex rel. National Broad. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Lake County,
556 N.E.2d 1120, 1129-30 (Ohio 1990) (discussing state interest of the highest order
and ruling that a court may not prohibit a television station from airing names and
photographs of jurors when such information was available to anyone attending the
trial absent imperative circumstances and no other recourse to serve the government's interest); Commonwealth v. Genovese, 487 A.2d 364, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (holding that a court's prohibition of the press's publication of the names of
jurors was an impermissible prior restraint that did not serve a state interest of the
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accident victims when the accident was of public interest,o safeguarding jury deliberations through a gag order on interviews well after
conclusion of the trial, 66 protecting the confidentiality of a state bar
association's evaluation of a potential judicial appointee,
informareceived
forcing a wiretap statute when the media lawfully
tion that was unlawfully obtained by another-68
The Florida Star analysis, which has not been limited to cases of
media defendants, has been applied to find that protecting a tenant's
right to obtain rental housing is an insufficient state interest to justify
impairing a credit agency's right to speak the truth, while a landlord's right to privacy is insufficient to justify punishing a neighborhood association for publishing the landlord's address and real estate
holdings.70 Several courts have found that a state's interest in eradicating discrimination in housing against unmarried cohabitants was
not a state interest of the highest order sufficient to trump the religious free exercise of a landlord who denied them housing.I
highest order when the names were available to anyone attending the trial).
See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 480-81, 497 (Cal. 1998)
(discussing but not applying FloridaStar, and determining that auto accident victims
who were trapped inside their overturned vehicle after it went off the highway had
no invasion of privacy action against a television station that filmed their extrication,
rescue, and helicopter transport to a hospital).
See Indiana v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ind. 1990) (finding that news reporters may not be charged with contempt of court for soliciting information regarding grand jury deliberations from jurors two years after the proceedings had
ended, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order).
67 See Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 62 (Ct. App. 1986).
Of note, the information gained by the media and reported in McClatchy was not
gleaned from public records, as was the information released in Daily Mail and Florida Star, but was secured from the media's own investigations. See id. at 59-60. The
court applied the Daily Mail standard to protect the media's news-gathering process,
noting that "a free press need not rely upon the sufferance of (the] government to
supply it with information." Id. at 62 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1979)).
68 See Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 718 (Pa. 1991) (finding that publishing
gambling-related information obtained from a wiretap was not protected by a state
interest of the highest order ).
69 See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. California, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a state statute that prohibited release of information about a potential
tenant's history of detainer actions impermissibly infringed on the reporting
agency's freedom of speech under the Florida Star test because it did not serve a state
interest of the highest order by prohibiting disseminating publicly available information - especially where the information was made public by the state itself).
70 See Near E. Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (noting that the information regarding the landlord was in public records and applying the Forida Star standard to protect the neighborhood organization from liability for communicating such truthful information that was lawfully obtained).
7
See Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 403-04
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B. State Interests of the Highest Order: What They May Be
While the United States Supreme Court's instruction on state interest of the highest order has primarily been by indirection, telling
us more frequently what do not qualify as state interests of the highest
order rather than what do, there have been indications in the Court's
case law of what magnitude of governmental interest is sufficiently vital to justify suppressing the content of speech. In Florida Star, for example, the Court left open the possibility that certain governmental
interests may be of such a magnitude that suppression of the First
Amendment's guarantee of a free press may be justified.n In so doing, however, the Court pointed to just one such example of a state
73
interest of the highest order: national security in times of war. Cit-

ing the Depression-era case of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,74 in
which the Court hypothesized that "publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops" during wartime
could constitutionally be blocked, notwithstanding the First Amendment,75 Justice Marshall suggested that only those governmental interests that speak to the continued existence of the government itself rise to
the level of state interests of the highest order such that they may
constitutionally override expressive liberties. It is difficult to imagine
a state interest of an order greater than preserving national security
during wartime,76 thereby preserving the existence of the state itself,
(Ct. App. 1994) (applying Yoder and holding that eradicating discrimination in housing against unmarried cohabitants is not a state interest of the highest order sufficient to "overbalance" a landlord's religious free exercise justification for exclusion),
affd in part, revd in part, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (1996) (holding that the landlord's free
exercise rights were not substantially burdened because she was not obligated to
rent her apartment). But see Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d
274, 282, 284 (Alaska 1994) (finding that eradicating discrimination in housing
against unmarried couples is a state interest of the highest order justifying interference with a landlord's asserted free exercise of religion claim). The Swanner court
waxed eloquently about what interests rose to the highest order level: "Substantial
threat to the public safety, peace, or order, or where there are competing state interests of the highest order." See id. at 281; see also Metropolitan Dade County Fair
Hous. & Employment Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 485
So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no state interest of the highest order in eradicating age discrimination in housing such that the state could not force
a mobile home park reserved for elderly residents to accept a 29-year-old prospective
tenant).
7
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
73 See id. (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
74 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
75 See id. at 716.

76 Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding under
traditional strict scrutiny analysis the race-based internment policy directed against
Japanese-Americans in order to serve the "compelling" governmental interest of national security during World War II).
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and it is telling indeed that Justice Marshall cited no other example of a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override expressive liberties.
Plainly, to Justice Marshall, "state interest of the highest order" meant
the very highest type of governmental interest, one that speaks to the
continued existence of the state itself and one that, if it were not
served, would jeopardize the continued existence of the state itself.
Other Supreme Court Justices have found that restrictions of
First Amendment liberties were justified by governmental interests
that, similarly, spoke to the structural integrity and continued operation of the state itself. For example, the Court found that punishing
a federal judge's illegal disclosure of a wiretap was justified in order
to serve the government's interest in the administration of the justice
system." In an ambiguous admixture of terminology 8 from both the
highest order doctrine and the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme
Court has reasoned that state civil rights laws aimed at eradicating
discrimination in public accommodations "plainly serve[ I compelling
state interests of the highest order." 7'
77 See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1995). Respondent
Aguilar,
a United States District Court judge, was convicted of illegally disclosing a wiretap in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(c) and attempted obstruction of justice under 18
U.S.C. § 1503 because he lied to FBI agents during a grand jury investigation. See id.

at 595. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed both convictions, holding that the respondent's behavior was not covered by the statutory language. See id. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the § 1503 charge, but reinstated the
conviction on the § 2232(c) wiretap disclosure charge. See id. at 606. Quoting Daily
Mail, the Court noted that the government may not generally prevent people from
disclosing information lawfully obtained absent a "'state interest of the highest order."' See id.at 605 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)). Noting that § 2232(c) only restricts disclosure to the extent that it would
"obstruct, impede, or prevent" the government's interception through the wiretap at
issue, however, the Court found that the government's interest in nondisclosure by
officials, such as federal judges, who are in sensitive, confidential positions, is a sufficient state interest to justify a broad statutory construction that criminalized the
judge's wrongful disclosure without running afoul of the First Amendment. See id at
605-06.
78 See infra notes 125-52 and accompanying text (discussing confusion
of the state
interest of the highest order doctrine with other due process standards).
79 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
The Roberts Court
upheld enforcement of a Minnesota civil rights law that prohibited the national Jaycees from requiring two local chapters to exclude women. See id. at 628-29. The
Court found that impairment of the right of free association "may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Id. at 623; see also New York State Clubs Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (upholding an anti-discrimination law encompassing private membership groups); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (finding that any potential infringement of the expressive
freedom of Rotary members caused by admission of female members would be justi-
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Lower courts similarly have ruled that eradicating discrimination
through public accommodations laws is a state interest of the highest
order. 80 It is perhaps somewhat ironic that Justice Marshall's "state
interest of the highest order" terminology, first articulated in his dissent in Bakke, calling for recognition of the vital state interest in
eradicating discrimination through affirmative action programs, has
been extensively cited by Supreme Court majorities and many lower
courts in upholding anti-discrimination legislation.8 ' Efforts to enfled by the promotion of the state's compelling interest in ending discrimination
against women); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (permitting a
discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a law
firm that refused to consider a woman for partnership and noting that while the
First Amendment may not outlaw some private invidious discrimination, the right to
discriminate has never been given affirmative constitutional protection); United
States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 120506 (N.Y. 1983) (rejecting a free association challenge to a state civil rights law requiring admission of women as squadron members and noting that "the constitution
places no value" on private discrimination as a form of association entitled to affirmative constitutional protection). See generally Michael M. Burns, The Exclusion of
Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321 (1983); Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association after
Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1878 (1984).
9o See Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D.N.J.
1986) (applying NewJersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) to require inclusion
of women in a quasi-public membership organization as serving a state interest of
the highest order), rev'd, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the organization was not a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the statute,
thereby avoiding the constitutional issue); see also Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398-99 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding equal employment opportunity for women and minorities is a compelling state interest of the highest order,
hence it justifies any interference with free religious exercise resulting from application of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 308 N.J. Super.
516, 540, 706 A.2d 270, 283 (App. Div.) (holding that the LAD, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, applies to
the Boy Scouts and trumps the Boy Scouts's asserted First Amendment claim of a
freedom of association right to exclude), certif.granted, 156 N.J. 381, 718 A.2d 1210
(1998); Lloyd Lions Club of Portland v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d
887, 892 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that eradicating discrimination is a state interest of the highest order).
81 Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that eradication of racial discrimination against
African-Americans and "bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life
should be a state interest of the highest order") and Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37
F.3d 1155, 1178 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., dissenting) (asserting that eradication of
racial discrimination in society is a state interest of the highest order and arguing
that remedial affirmative action legislation benefiting minorities should therefore be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny) with Roberts, 468 U.S. at
624; Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; New York State Clubs, 487 U.S. at 18; and
Ridgewood Kiwanis, 627 F. Supp. at 1389. But see Hurley v. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (finding that the state's interest in eradicating discrimination in public accommodations based on sexual orientation is an
insufficient interest to trump the First Amendment speech rights of parade organiz-
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force anti-discrimination legislation as a means of serving a state interest of the highest order have caused successive generations of First
Amendment challenges as groups finding themselves required by law
to admit members in a nondiscriminatory manner have asserted their
right of freedom of expressive association in an effort to fend off sequential statutes outlawing discrimination based on race, sex, and,
most recently, sexual orientation."'
State courts and lower federal courts applying the state interest
of the highest order doctrine have not always required the government to demonstrate an interest of the magnitude suggested by Justice Marshall. Rather, they have usually found that an interest rises to
the level of a state interest of the highest order when the asserted interest speaks to the administration of the government itself or the
protection of highly sensitive personal privacy rights. For example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that assuring the continers who wished to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual marching contingent from
the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that eradicating discrimination is a state interest of the highest order, but that "in a direct clash of
'highest order' interests, the interest in protecting the free exercise of religion embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution prevails over the interest in ending discrimination embodied in Title VII"). Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231 (1972) (leaving open the question of whether education is a state interest of the
highest order, but holding that requiring Amish children to attend public high
school against their religious objections was not the sole means of attaining the interest in assuring adequate education).
82 See generally Eunice A. Eichelburger, Annotation, Civil Rights
Laws Prohibiting
Organization'sMembership Restrictions as Violating Organization'sor its Members' Rights of
Association Under Federal Constitution's First Amendment, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1986)
(recapping United States Supreme Court and state cases considering the free association implications of enforcing civil rights and public accommodations laws in the
membership selection of private or quasi-public organizations); Donald T. Kramer,
Annotation, Construction and Application of § 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Excludingfrom the Act's Coverage Private Clubs and Other Establishments not in Fact Open to
the Public, 8 A.L.R. FED. 634 (1971); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Exclusion or Expulsion from Association or Club as Violation of State Civil Rights Act, 38 A.L.R. 4th 628
(1981). See also generally Dwight G. Duncan, Paradingthe First Amendment Through the
Streets of South Boston, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 663, 679 (1996); William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Symposium, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality and Collisions of
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411 (1997) (discussing antigay discrimination and likening it to religious discrimination, and reviewing cases
involving application of statutes prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation that involved Georgetown University and the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade);
Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of AntiDiscriminationLaws to Quasi-PrivateClubs, 2 MicH. J. GENDER & L. 27 (1994); Lauren
J. Rosenblum, Note, Equal Access or FreeSpeech: The Constitutionality of Public Accommodations Laws, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1243 (1997) (tracing the application of public accommodations laws to serve compelling state interests and analyzing the City of
Cleveland's effort to prohibit sex-segregated audiences at speaking engagements by
Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan).
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ued operation of government emergency services was a state interest
of the highest order sufficient to override individual liberties.0 In
Florida, the public's interest in monitoring governmental actions
through open public meetings also has been adjudged a state interest
of the highest order.84 In the area of law enforcement - certainly
one of the essential ingredients of preserving ordered liberty in a
state - courts have found that facilitating apprehension of criminal
suspects by preserving the confidentiality of sealed indictments prior
to arrest or initiation ofjudicial proceedings served a state interest of
the highest order, as do government actions taken to protect witnesses and conduct criminal investigations," to prohibit in-court pho83

See Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 1992).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a trial court's issuance of an injunction to
end a labor union's work stoppage and enter into court-supervised negotiations with
the city. See id. at 1187-88. The court found that the danger posed to the public police, fire, and emergency medical services because of the work cessation justified the
trial court's issuance of an injunction. See id. at 1191. The court found that the
strike posed a "clear and present danger" to the health, safety, or welfare of the public, thus justifying a restriction on the employment union's speech interests. See id.
The dissent opined, however, that the injunction amounted to an unconstitutional
prior restraint on the labor union's speech. See id. at 1196-97 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Citing Daily Mail, the dissent asserted that only a state interest of the highest
order could justify stifling the union's ability to strike. See id. (citing Smith v. Daily
Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)).
84 See Turner v. Wainright, 379 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting
that enforcement of the Florida Open Public Meetings Act serves the public's interest in securing information about the operations of the government; thus, preserving democratic processes serves state interests of the highest order); Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assoc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) ("In general application, Florida's public records law and its companion,
the open public meetings law, promote a state interest of the highest order. By
promoting open government and citizen awareness of its workings... [they] enhance and preserve democratic processes.").
85 See Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Weshafer, 570 F. Supp. 1447, 1449 (S.D.
Ind. 1983) (upholding against a First Amendment challenge an Indiana statute that
prohibited the release of information or indictments that were sealed by court order
because it served a state interest of the highest order and was narrowly tailored to
serve that interest with the least possible burden on the press), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1219,
1222 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the judge's order against the media was unconstitutional), affd, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985) (summarily affirming the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the trial court without hearing argument or drafting a formal opinion). But
see Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Although criminal proceedings implicate state interests of the highest order.... the state interest at issue
here is consistent with other kinds of interests the Court has found sufficient to invoke abstention [from interference with application of state law that impaired individual's constitutional rights].") (internal citation omitted); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1971) (discussing criteria to which federal courts should look
when deciding whether to intervene or abstain when a state's criminal proceedings
mat interfere with constitutional liberties).
See Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 564 (Ct. App.

1999] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH?

1219

tography absent the presiding judge's consent,87 to assure public
safety,8 and to assure order and safety in prisons.89
In the area of privacy protection, courts have found that there
may be state interests of the highest order in protecting child sex
abuse victims,90 safeguarding children through day care licensing re1988) ("The interest of the state to protect witnesses and to conduct criminal investigations is sufficient to overcome the Times' First Amendment right to publish
Doe's name."). The case at bar in Times Mirror involved the publication of the name
of a witness to a crime. See id. at 558-59. The court expressed concern that a failure
to protect the privacy of such witnesses through assuring the confidentiality of their
names and identities would make witnesses reluctant to come forward to assist
authorities in solving crimes, and could jeopardize the safety of witnesses when the
susvect is still at large. See id. at 564.
See Marin Indep. Journal v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 555
(Ct.
App. 1993). The Matin Independent Journal,a newspaper, brought an action challenging a court's seizure of film negatives as a prior restraint on speech. See id. at
552. The film was seized when a reporter snapped a photograph of a criminal defendant in violation of a court rule. See id. The court cited Daily Mail and Florida
Star for the proposition that the media could only be punished for publishing legally
obtained truthful information if such punishment furthered a state interest of the
highest order, see id. at 554-55, yet found that the photos were unlawfully obtained
and therefore outside of the protection of those cases. See id. at 555. The court
noted, "It would make a mockery of [the law], and of the power and dignity of the
court, to allow publication of photographs unlawfully obtained." Id.
88 See State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 578
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Public safety
and the protection of human life is a state interest of the highest order.").
89 See Allah v. Beyer, Civ. No. 92-0651, 1994 WL 549614, at *6-7
(D.N.J. Mar. 29,
1994) (holding that prison safety is a state interest of the highest order justifying any
interference with religious free exercise caused by relocation of a Muslim prisoners'
group leader who had allegedly planned substantial disruption of prison operations); Pollock v. Marshall, 656 F. Supp. 957, 962 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that a
prison regulation requiring an inmate to cut his hair contrary to his religious beliefs
did not violate the First Amendment insofar as it contributed to prison safety and
thereby served a legitmate state interest sufficient to outweigh the inmate's religious
interests).
90 See In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ill. 1992). The majority
upheld a trial
court's prohibition of the publication of the names of child abuse victims and distinguished the case from Daily Mail on the grounds that Daily Mail involved an effort
to forbid publication of juvenile criminal offenders whereas the case sub judice involved protection of child victims. See id. In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Miller
argued that the First Amendment "prohibits the State from inviting journalists into a
courtroom and simultaneously editing or censoring what they report about the proceedings." Id. at 1058 (Miller, C.J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the government must demonstrate a state interest of the highest order to justify punishing
the media for publishing truthful information lawfully obtained. See id. (citing
Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)). The dissent found the difference between protecting privacy rights of juvenile offenders and adult rape victims - held
to be insufficient interests to justify impairing the First Amendment in Daily Mail
and Florida Star, respectively - and protecting the privacy rights of juvenile victims
to be constitutionally insignificant. See id.at 1058-59 (Miller, C.J., dissenting). But
seeJacksonville Television, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitation Servs.,
659 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding the state's interest in protecting the privacy of children is a state interest of the highest order, but that interest is

1220

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 29:1197

quirements,' assuring adequacy of secular education programs offered at religious schools, 92 sanctioning the media for a knowing violation of federal wiretap statutes regarding information of purely pri'i3
vate concern, preventing the release of information unlawfully
obtained by the media, 94 safeguarding residential privacy against the

insufficient to justify a prior restraint on the media prohibiting airing of a television
interview with the child's mother that was filmed prior to a judge's imposition of a
gag order on discussion of case with media).
9.1See North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518, 526 (E.D. Cal.
1988) (finding that although a state day care licensing statute burdened a churchrun preschool, the statute served a state interest of the highest order, safeguarding
children, and, therefore, withstood a Free Exercise Clause challenge by the church).
92 See New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow,
885 F.2d
940, 951 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding a state statute that permitted the state to scrutinize the secular education of a religious group against a Free Exercise Clause challenge). In a case that purported to apply Wisconsin v. Yoder but reached the opposite
result, the court found that the state's interest in education was a compelling interest sufficient to interfere with religious exercise. See id. at 944. The court refused,
however, to consider less restrictive alternatives to the state's monitoring plan and
spoke interchangeably of "compelling" state interests and state interests "of the
highest order," making it unclear what level of scrutiny the court was applying. See
id. at 946. The Fifth Circuit opted for a balancing test rather than a traditional strict
scrutiny standard and found that application of a less restrictive means to assure
educational quality was not required. See id. at 950.
93 See Natoli v. Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 616
N.Y.S.2d
318 (App. Div. 1994). A newspaper used information that was unlawfully obtained
from a wiretap to print a story about the plaintiffs who sued under a federal statute
that provided criminal and civil penalties for unlawful wiretapping. See id. at 505-06.
The trial court applied the federal law's sanctions against the newspaper and distinguished the case from FloridaStar and Daily Mail on the ground that the newspaper
had knowledge that the information in question was illegally obtained. See id. at 510.
The court noted that the danger of chilling the press's speech rights was minimal
and that "[t]he civil sanctions of 18 U.S.C. § 2520 [were] narrowly tailored to a federal (constitutional) interest of the highest order." Id. It should be noted that Natoli
is an anomaly insofar as it punishes the media for publishing truthful information.
See Peavy v. New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532, 538 n.23 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (declining
to follow the reasoning of Natoli, noting that it is a "lone holding which offers no
controlling precedent" and that the information revealed in violation of the federal
wiretap statute was "purely private, with no public interest served by their revelation"). Natoli's aberrant ruling thus seems to have no relevance when the information, such as the extreme racist statements by a school board member at issue in
Peary, pertains to information of interest to the public.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (finding, in
the infamous Pentagon Papers case, that the government had demonstrated an insufficient interest to justify a prior restraint enjoining the publication of a confidential study on Vietnam War policymaking secured by the media); Marin Indep. Journal v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 555 (Ct. App. 1993) (acknowledging
the Daily Mail rule that the media may be punished for publishing legally obtained
truthful information only to further a state interest of the highest order, but finding
that photos of a defendant taken in violation of a court order were unlawfully obtained).
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persistent demonstrations of political protesters," and possibly preserving the privacy interests of a murder victim's family.6
These varying applications of the state interest of the highest order doctrine suggest that the legitimate basis upon which the government elects to exercise its power to legislate, remedy, adjudicate,
administer, or protect does not meet the standard of the state interest of the highest order doctrine. Rather, the standard requires a far
greater state interest before it will constitutionally legitimate the government's interference with the content of an individual's First
Amendment liberties.97
Looking to cases that have found the presence of such an interest, it is clear that the government must have an interest of paramount importance to justify its suppression of the content of an individual's speech. Such interests include preserving national security
and preserving and defending the state itself through law enforcement, open public government, personal security, and privacy.
These are interests that speak to the basic reasons for which people
have formed political states in the first place, 98 interests of such magSee Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (declaring that the assurance of
residential privacy is a state interest of the highest order); Murray v. Lawson, 138 N.J.
206, 235, 649 A.2d 1253, 1268 (1994) (upholding an injunction prohibiting antiabortion protesters from picketing in front of a physician's residence because the
injunction did not preclude the protesters from demonstrating and served the state
interest in preserving residential privacy).
96 See Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675
N.E.2d 249, 256, 257 (Il. App. Ct.
1996) (finding that a plaintiff had adequately pleaded causes of action for public
disclosure of private facts and intentional infliction of emotional distress when the
media intruded into her son's hospital room and published photos taken of him as
he was dying from a gunshot wound); Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.,
411 S.E.2d 664, 671 (S.C. 1991) (Toal, J., dissenting) (finding that whether a state's
interest in preserving privacy was a state interest of the highest order sufficient to
trump the media's right to report information of public interest regarding the private life and moral turpitude of a murder victim and her mother is ajury question).
97 See, e.g.,
Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990) ("It
is beyond dispute that government has, in extraordinary circumstances, a responsibility to protect highly sensitive information against public dissemination. But the
principles enunciated in The Florida Star v. BJ.F.... do not apply as defendants
contend they do ....Under the facts presented here, that balance plainly favors the
plaintiff.") (internal citations omitted).
See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, § 124
(Prometheus Books 1986) (1690). Writing toward the end of the 17th Century,
Locke theorized that protection of property, order, and individual liberty were the
catalysts for the formation of civil government. See id. Locke wrote: "The great and
chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves
under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting." Id Locke further argues that a person enters
society and gives up the absolute freedom and autonomy enjoyed in the state of nature in order "better to preserve himself, his liberty and property." Id. § 131.
95
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nitude that were they not served through legislation or other state action, the very existence of the state could be jeopardized. These interests are of such a magnitude that they arguably surpass the level of
those interests traditionally considered worthy of the "compelling"
state interest'category under the traditional strict scrutiny analysis of
government acts that impair individual liberty. Saving a human life,"
combating espionage and protecting national security,' °° preventing
war, 1 1and protecting due process rights of an accused facing prosecution would likewise be state interests of such magnitude. Thus,
these cases suggest that when the content of constitutionally protected
expressive liberties is impaired by state action, the government
should be put to the test of justifying its actions as designed to advance a more than compelling state interest, rather, one "of the
highest order."
C. Narrow Tailoringand Interests "Not Otherwise Served"
The amorphous "highest order" standard first articulated in Yoderwas paired with an even more elusive second prong requiring that
the asserted state interest be one "not otherwise served" before the
state's interest may "overbalance"'' 02 a protected expressive liberty interest. 13 Expounding upon what the "not otherwise served" prong
See State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Public safety
and the protection of human life is a state interest of the highest order.").
100See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733-37 (1971) (White,
J., concurring); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (theorizing
that issues of national security such as shipment dates of armed forces may be information that the government may constitutionally prohibit the media from disseminating).
101 See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
849 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart emphasized that the government may not
constitutionally punish communication of information once it has lawfully fallen
into the hands of the press. See id. The Justice argued that such punishment would
be justified only if "the need for secrecy is manifestly overwhelming." Id. In a footnote elaborating on the meaning of that threshold, the Justice said, "National defense is the most obvious justification for government restrictions on publication.
Even then, distinctions must be drawn between prior restraints and subsequent penalties." Id. (citing New York Times, 403 U.S. at 733-37 (White, J., concurring); Near,
283 U.S. at 716).
102 The Court's use of this novel word, "overbalance," should
not be taken to
mean "balance" as in the quid pro quo sense of "outweigh." Rather, "overbalance"
as used in Yoder can only mean "trump," "negate," or "defeat."
103See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). In assessing Wisconsin's
desire to compel Amish children to attend public high schools rather than receive
home schooling in vocational arts, the Supreme Court noted that the state's interest
in education does not require that all other interests yield to it, particularly because
compulsory education interfered with a competing liberty interest. See id. In articulating the standard, Chief Justice Burger stated that "only those interests of the
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may actually mean, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "however strong
the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no
means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.' 0 4
Because it was satisfied that the tightly-knit, agrarianoriented, and church-centered Amish society adequately served the
educational needs of its own children by stressing hands-on vocational learning of the skills needed to contribute to the insular Amish
society, the Court found that the state's interest in education was,
thus, otherwise served.0 5 Accordingly, the Court declined to address
whether compulsory education was a state interest of the highest order, but rather rested its holding on the sui generis nature of the culture and traditions of the separatist Amish society; thus the Court
found that the educational needs of Amish youngsters are met by
public schooling in the early primary grades and vocational homeschooling in trades such that the youngsters will learn the skills necessary to become contributing members of their rather unique society.106
On its face, the second prong of Yoder's version of the state interest of the highest order doctrine seems to require that before a
state may interfere with the content of a First Amendment liberty, it
must demonstrate a highest order interest that cannot be served by any
other means. The Court's language regarding interests "not otherwise
served" and an interest not "absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests" suggests an even more stringent analysis of
the state's means of meeting its interest than the "least restrictive alternative" standard required when the Court applies the strict scrutiny analysis to a governmental impairment of a constitutional liberty.' O' Rather than requiring that the government pursue merely the
least restrictive means to achieve its interest, the highest order doctrine requires that there be no other alternativebefore the government
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to
the free exercise of religion." Id.
104 Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland,
366
U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)). The state had argued that its interest in educating
youngsters was "so compelling that even the established religious practices of the

Amish must give way." Id. at 221. The Court rejected such a suggestion, noting,
"Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot

accept such a sweeping claim .. " Id. Because of the religious liberty implicated,
the Court said that "we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote...." Id.
105See id. at 229.
106 See id.
SeeTRBE, supra note 11, § 16-7, at 1454 (explaining due process review of gov107

ernmental impairment of fundamental rights).
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may interfere with the content of expressive liberties. However, the
Yoder free exercise standard was never as strong as it was on the day it
was announced, for lower courts and the Supreme Court itself have
surprisingly reduced the level of scrutiny to which they subject governmental actions that interfere with the free exercise of religion." 8
The Court's application of the state interest of the highest order
doctrine in Florida Star v. B.JF' 9 holds the state to a similarly demanding second prong. Of note, however, the Florida Star opinion
did not speak in terms of an interest "not otherwise served." Rather,
the Court imposed a lower threshold in analyzing the state's chosen
means to serve its goals, noting that the statute must be "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order."'10 Despite this language,
the Court's analysis was, in fact, exacting and the state's effort to punish the media had to fail because of the existence of at least one other
alternative to meet the state's goals. The Court found that the government itself released the name of the rape victim to the newspaper
and, therefore, the government itself possessed the means to serve the
government's interest of protecting the privacy of the victim.' Accordingly, the state could not justify punishing the media for publishing truthful information which it received lawfully from the government
itself 1 2 In other words, the state's interest could be "otherwise
served" through the government's own improved self-policing of the
release of sensitive information to the media. The state's inability to
meet this second standard of the doctrine doomed its effort to punish the media for its violation of the state statute forbidding publication of the name of a rape victim; thus, the impairment of the press's
fundamental liberty could not be justified. The Court did not speak
in terms of narrowing or tailoring the state's statute. Rather, the existence of one alternative means to serve the state's interest sufficed to
decide the case. Thus, Florida Stars "narrowly tailored" requirement
actually operates in the exact same manner as does the "not otherwise served" prong applied in Yoder.
t08 Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 ("[D]espite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interest that the State seeks to promote.., and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing
the claimed ... exemption.") with Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (finding that laws of general application still apply
despite an incidental impact on a religious interest); see also TRIBE, supra note 11,
§ 14-13, at 1260 (suggesting that post-Yoder decisions have reduced the burden of
persuasion imposed upon the state before it may interfere with religion).
109 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
1o Id. at 541 (emphasis added).

I" See id.
112 See id.
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Several of the lower court cases discussed above implicitly addressed the "not otherwise served" prong of the highest order doctrine by assessing whether the presence or absence of other means of
serving the state's interest justified impairing speech liberties. For
example, an injunction curtailing protests outside the home of a physician was realistically the only means by which the state's interest in
preserving residential privacy could be served. 3 Most cases applying
the state interest of the highest order doctrine, however, have found
that there were alternate means available to serve the state's interest;
therefore, suppression of expressive liberty was notjustified." 4 In two
cases that characterized protection of the privacy interests of juveniles to be state interests of the highest order, the courts nevertheless
noted that the state's interest did not justify imposing a prior restraint on the media regarding information that had previously been
lawfully obtained.' 5 Additionally, courts have found that dissemination of information that is already publicly available from other
sources may not lawfully be enjoined because the state had an alternative means to protect any privacy interests by preventing
dissemina6
place."
first
the
in
public
the
to
information
the
tion of
113
114

SeeMurray v. Lawson, 138 N.J. 206, 234, 649 A.2d 1253, 1268 (1994).
See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir.

1989) (holding that a television station could not be held liable for tortious interference with the privacy of a rape victim for publication of her first name, details of the
rape, and a picture of her residence, because the rape was newsworthy; and noting
alternatives to serve the state's interest in protecting the victim's privacy, such as imposing liability when the rape is not newsworthy or the information is unlawfully obtained or statutorily preserving the confidentiality of the state's records); StarTelegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. 1995) (noting that a rape victim
did not avail herself of a statutory right to have a pseudonym used in all records relating to her case and that the prosecutor had disclosed the victim's true identity
several times during the case, thus demonstrating that alternate means were available to protect the victim's privacy short of impairing freedom of the press); State v.
Globe Communications, 648 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (Fla. 1994) (likening a rape shield
statute that punished the media to the statute at issue in Florida Star due to its broad
sweep and underinclusiveness, which indicated that it was insufficiently tailored to
serve the state's articulated purpose).
11 See Jacksonville Television, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Health
& Rehabilitative
Servs., 659 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (preventing the release of an
interview with a minor recorded prior to issuance of a protective order was an impermissible prior restraint on speech); In re M.B., 484 N.W.2d 1154, 1159-60 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) (finding that the state's interest did not justify imposing a prior restraint on the media's publication of a child offender's name when the identity and
address of the juvenile had been released prior to the entrance of the court's protective order).
16 See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. California, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a state statute that prohibited release of information about a potential
tenant's history of detainer actions impermissibly infringed on the reporting
agency's freedom of speech because it prohibited dissemination of information that
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In a case reminiscent of Florida Star, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Doe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia"7 properly applied the second prong of the highest order doctrine when it
addressed the tension created by a state statute that prohibited publication of a rape victim's name and, thus, impaired the media's right
to gather and report the news. ' 8 The court found that there was a
means by which the state could otherwise serve its interest in protecting the rape victim's anonymity without impairing the press's freedom." 9 In a case in which a rape victim who was a state university
employee sought a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction preventing the release by campus police of an incident report regarding her rape, the court held that the campus newspaper
had an Open Records Act right to receive the report, but that the
rape victim confidentiality statute precluded the campus police from
releasing to the media the victim's name and identity. 20 The court
stressed that a newspaper that legally obtained correct information
could not be reprimanded without a need to further a state interest
of the highest order, 2 ' but that the state's interest in protecting the
victim's privacy and thereby not deterring future victims from coming forward could be adequately served by prohibiting the release of
a victim's name by the police, i.e., by the government itself'2 This is
precisely the solution that the Florida lower court failed to perceive
when it imposed liability
on the media for violating the rape shield
23
statute in FloridaStar.1

D. What Level of ConstitutionalScrutiny Is Intended?
Why did the Courts in Yoder and FloridaStar,and Justice Marshall
in his dissent in Bakke, not simply operate within the existing framework for analysis of impairment of a constitutional right or fundamental liberty: applying either a traditional balancing test in Yoder,
intermediate scrutiny, with its requirement of a significant state interest and means substantially tailored to advancing that interest
was made publicly available by the state itself); Star-Telegram, 915 S.W.2d at 475
(finding that a newspaper's publication of identifying information that did not specifically name a rape victim was constitutionally protected because requiring the
press to contemplate every burden on victims would have a chilling effect on its ability to inform the public).
17 452 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
11
"1,
120

121
122
123

See id.at 777.

See id. at 782.
See id. at 782-83.
See id. at 781 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)).
782.

See id. at

See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing FloridaStar).
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standard, in Bakke, or strict scrutiny, with its compelling state interest
and least restrictive means standard, in F/oridaSta.
Applying a traditional balancing test in Yoder could easily have
reached the same conclusion that a fundamental First Amendment
interest in the free exercise of religion, and in the "salvation" of the
human soul, as the defendants argued, outweighed the routine police power interest in education. (What possible state interest could
trump the individual's interest in eternal salvation?) Since a simple
balancing test could settle the dispute, why did Chief Justice Burger
coin the "state interest of the highest order" standard if not to ratchet
up the level of scrutiny? Were the Court to accept Justice Marshall's
contention that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to impose complete colorblindness upon the government and that state
efforts to compensate for past governmental discrimination should
be subjected merely to intermediate scrutiny rather than to strict
scrutiny, then the intermediate scrutiny standard itself could justify
affirmative action programs because they serve a substantial governmental interest - eradicating government-endorsed racial discrimination - as long as they are substantially tailored to meeting that
goal. If intermediate scrutiny itself is sufficient, what did Justice Marshall have in mind by invoking the language "state interest of the
highest order" if not to elevate the weight that the government must
give to the interests being advanced? If the Court in Florida Star felt
that traditional strict scrutiny would have been sufficient to protect
the First Amendment liberty at issue, why did it not simply apply strict
scrutiny? Why instead did it apply the state interest of the highest
order and no alternative means standard if not to raise the bar by providing the media with virtually impenetrable protection for the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information?
Florida Star is the clearest indication that the Court must have
felt that traditional levels of scrutiny were insufficient to safeguard
the liberty interests at stake. The Court provided the media with
rock-solid protection for the publication of truth, envisioning an exception to the media's near-absolute right to publish the truth only
when there is a state interest of the highest order - which the Court
likened to safeguarding the national security by proscribing publication of sensitive information such as the movement dates and numbers of troops of the armed forces engaged in military maneuvers124
and no other means feasible than what the government is proposing to serve that interest. Such an interest is one vital to the contin-

124

See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 532.
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ued survival of the government, suggesting that interests meeting the
highest order standard are only those that must be served at the peril
of the demise of the state itself if they go unserved. Florida Star clearly
suggests that the Court intended to set the bar so high that the impairment of First Amendment liberties - the government's suppression of speech because of its content - can be constitutionally justified
only when the continued existence of the state itself is at risk and
when the state's interest in self-preservation can be served by no
other means.
Such an interpretation of the state interest of the highest order
doctrine is indicated by the Court's opinions in Yoder and Florida Star
and by Justice Marshall's dissent in Bakke. A refusal to read these
opinions asjustifying an elevated level of scrutiny beyond those normally
applied by courts would be to render utterly superfluous the "state
interest of the highest order" language that must have been deliberately used by the Justices. It would be impertinent to impute such extreme carelessness to the Justices such that their invocations of "state
interest of the highest order" actually meant nothing new and were
merely an alternative means of expressing the same old standards of
scrutiny traditionally applied by the Court.
IV. How THE STATE INTEREST OF THE HIGHEST ORDER STANDARD
HAS BEEN APPLIED AND MISAPPLIED

A.

Misapplicationsand Confusion with TraditionalStrict Scrutiny
Review

As discussed above, the state interest of the highest order doctrine has most often been applied in First Amendment cases involving free exercise of religion claims or efforts to punish the media for
publication of truthful yet sensitive information. As these cases most
readily fall within the Yoder and Florida Star framework, this should
not be surprising. But outside of the line of cases that are strictly on
point, the history of the state interest of the highest order doctrine
has been one of frequently inconsistent application in the lower
courts, which have had varying success trying to distinguish whether
it requires a balancing of constitutional interests, strict scrutiny of
governmental actions that offend constitutional rights, or some other
level of scrutiny.
Despite the strong language of Yoder regarding the need for the
state to articulate an interest of the highest order to justify interference with an individual's right to religious free exercise, the Court in
the same breath spoke of a balancing framework in which to perform

1999] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO FREEDOMOFSPEECH?

1229

its analysis. 2 5 ChiefJustice Burger noted that only government interests of the highest order, "and those not otherwise served," are sufficient to "overbalance" the individual's First Amendment right to the
free exercise of religion.2 6 That language has appeared in numerous
cases applying the doctrine, particularly those involving claims of religious free exercise. 2 7 Some religious free exercise cases, nevertheless, invoke a strict scrutiny analysis even while they speak in terms of
balancing competing interests.2 8 Even in some cases that involve the
rights of the media and that cite F/orida Star, the courts applying the
doctrine have nevertheless spoken in terms of balancing competing
interests rather than applying heightened scrutiny due process protection to a fundamental liberty.'2' Some judges have failed to reSee Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
See id.
127See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398
(4th Cir.
1990); Pollock v. Marshall, 656 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D. Ohio 1987). The Fourth Circuit, in Shenandoah Baptist Church, upheld application of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) to a church-operated school against a free-exercise defense by
the church. See Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d at 1399. The court stated:
"Against what is, at most, a limited burden to Shenandoah's free exercise rights, we
must weigh the reasons for applying both the minimum wage and equal pay provisions of the FLSA to (the school]." Id. at 1398. The court concluded that the state's
interest in assuring equal employment opportunity was a state interest of the highest
order, and that because a failure to apply the law would undermine the goals of the
statute, "the balance tips toward the application of the FLSA." Id. Considering a
Native American prisoner's free exercise of religion claim seeking exemption from a
prison haircutting requirement, the court in Pollock found that the prison system's
concerns for prison security and inmate discipline "reasonably and substantially justified" the hair-length restriction. See Pollock, 656 F. Supp. at 962. The court said
that "[b]alanced against these legitimate state interests, plaintiff's religious practice
of wearing his hair longer than allowed.., must yield." Id.
128 See Allah v. Beyer, Civ. No. 92-0651, 1994 WL 549614, at *5 (D.N.J.
Mar. 24,
1994). The Allah court found that the New Jersey State Prison system's transfer of a
potentially disruptive prisoner was justified as a "compelling state interest" and was
the "least restrictive means to satisfy the state's compelling interest." Id. at *7.
19 See, e.g., Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465,
471 (D.N.H. 1990).
The Connell court applied Florida Star's standard to protect the First Amendment interests of a newspaper photographer who demanded access to an accident scene. See
id. at 466, 471. The court stated, "The appropriate analysis balances plaintiff's rights
against police authority to secure an accident scene. Under the facts presented
here, that balance plainly favors the plaintiff." Id. at 471; see also, e.g., Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230, 1235-36 (Mont. 1993), overruled by Sacco v. High
Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (1995). In a libel action for publication of
information about an attorney misconduct investigation, the court, speaking in
terms of balancing competing interests, invoked Daily Mail and Florida Star and concluded:
If the public's interest in the dissemination of truth outweighs the
state's interest in protecting the privacy of rape victims or juvenile offenders, then surely the public's interest in accurate information about
attorney discipline outweighs the state's interest in preserving the con15
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quire narrow tailoring of the state's means to effect its interest, stating solely that the state's means must advance a state interest of the
highest order.""
Adding to the confusion surrounding the doctrine, the state interest of the highest order was discussed by Justice Marshall in his
Bakke dissent within the context of his preference for the application
of an intermediate scrutiny analysis of a state affirmative action program to which the majority had applied strict scrutiny.' 31 Justice Marshall argued that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate level of
analysis for a reverse discrimination claim, in part because the eradication of pernicious and enduring effects of discrimination against
African-Americans by the government is a state interest of the highest
order.'3 In the Bakke mold, some courts have also spoken in terms of
significant governmental interests and intermediate scrutiny virtually
in the same
breath as invoking the state interest of the highest order
33
doctrine.

More common, and perhaps fueling confusion most of all, is the
application of the state interest of the highest order doctrine in place
of the strict scrutiny analysis in cases that usually do receive such a
heightened level of scrutiny from courts because fundamental liberties are implicated.'3s Among these are cases involving free exercise
fidentiality of Commission on Practice investigations, where, as here,
the press obtained the information lawfully.
Id. at 1236.
130
See Holtzscheiter v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 664, 671 (S.C.
1991) (Toal,J., dissenting) (stating that whether a matter was one of public interest
posed a jury question and stating that a newspaper could only be penalized for publication of a truthful statement to advance a state interest of the highest order);
Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 62 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating
that media may not be sanctioned for publishing the truth absent a need to advance
a state interest of the highest order).
1
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
132
See id.
133 See, e.g., Murray v. Lawson, 138 N.J. 206,
218-20, 649 A.2d 1253, 1259-60
(1994). In a case in which a physician brought an action seeking an injunction to
deter anti-abortionists from picketing in front of his residence, the court noted that
the United States Supreme Court had deemed the assurance of residential privacy to
be a state interest of the highest order. See id. at 220, 649 A.2d at 1260 (citing Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)). Applying a time, place, and manner analysis
akin to intermediate scrutiny to analyze the injunction's impairment of speech interests, the court reasoned that the injunction, as the state's means of effecting its
highest order interest, must "'burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest."' Id. at 219, 649 A.2d at 1259 (quoting Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 754 (1994)).
134 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting
that strict scrutiny analysis applies when a state action tramples upon a citizen's fun-

1999] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO FREEDOMOF SPEECH?

1231

of religion,' 5 criminal proceedings, 's freedom of association, 37 prior
restraints,1'3 and freedom of the press.3 9 Often, courts seem to be
careless in their articulation of terms, merely using "state interest 140
of
the highest order" and "compelling state interest" interchangeably.
damental constitutional rights).
135 See Allah v. Beyer, Civ. No. 92-0651, 1994
WL 549614, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 24,
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 403-04 (Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that a landlord's free exercise rights were violated when a state
commission prohibited discrimination against unmarried couples), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (1996) (holding that the landlord's free exercise rights
were not substantially burdened because she was not obligated to rent her apartment, thereby avoiding the constitutional question). The lower court in Smith, applying Yoder, said that "only those interests of the highest order... can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion" and found that the state "has no
compelling interest in promoting the housing rights of unmarried couples such as
would outweigh plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise rights." Smith, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 403-04 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 718 (1981)).
136 See Ronwin v. Dunham, 818 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1987).
137 See New York State Clubs Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988); Board of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts v.
United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984); see also infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text (discussing Roberts and its progeny).
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schmidt, 360 N.W.2d 433, 435 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). The court found that ajuvenile court invalidly prohibited the media
from printing information legally obtained from public records when it prohibited
the press from releasing the names and photographs of the juveniles involved in the
court matter or other particular information relating to their parents. See id. Quoting Daily Mail, the court reminded that the state was not permitted to punish the
press for legally publishing truthful information without a need to advance a state
interest of the highest order. See id. In scrutinizing the juvenile court's order, however, the court concluded that the possibility of a juvenile's increased anxiety over
newspaper publications about the proceeding did not qualify as a compelling state
interest sufficient to justify the restraint on speech gathered from public records. See
id. at 435-36; see also Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Lee, 353 N.W.2d 213
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In a case vacating a trial court's gag order on the press during a juvenile dependency case, the court quoted the state interest of the highest
order language in Daily Mail and held that the order was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech. See Minneapolis Star, 353 N.W.2d at 215. In analyzing the gag
order, however, the court also said that a restraint on free speech "must be
,necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and.., narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."' Id. (quoting Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)).
1s,
See Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990).
140 See Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV. 98-594,
1998 WL 436897, at *4-7 (D.D.C.
July 28, 1998) (giving consideration to varying levels of scrutiny that could be applied to a wiretap violation claim, considering diminished standards of First
Amendment scrutiny and strict scrutiny, and finally concluding that "following Florida Star, the Court must examine the application of the wiretap statutes with strict
scrutiny"); Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 455
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 1990) (Cavanaugh, J., concurring). In a judgment upholding a
state's licensing requirements for a church-operated day care center, Justice Cavanaugh wrote a separate concurrence on the free exercise issue and stated that the
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Other courts directly and unabashedly confuse the doctrine with
strict scrutiny.4 1 Very often, however, courts wed the phrase state interest of the highest order with language talismanic of strict scrutiny,
requiring the state to demonstrate a "compelling state interest of the

proper standard to apply to an impairment of the free exercise of religion requires
the state to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and that there are "no
alternative, less drastic means" that could serve its ends. See id. In announcing this
standard, though, the court immediately cited and quoted Yoder, noting "only state
interests 'of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.'" Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). In laying out the test it would apply, the court said:
[T]he burden imposed on licensure of the day-care center must be
analyzed under strict scrutiny ....
Given the nature of the defendants' sincerely held religious objection to licensure, it is clear as a
matter of constitutional fact that the burden imposed by licensure is
both direct and coercive so that strict scrutiny must be applied to analyze the constitutionality of the state's restriction on defendants' religious practices ....
Id. at 10 (Cavanaugh, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In the very next paragraph, the court declared that the state had "met its burden of showing a compelling state interest" by demonstrating "its interest in licensing, which is 'of the highest
order.'" Id. (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). Not to be outdone in mixing and
matching terms, Justice Griffin filed an opinion concurring and dissenting in which
he proclaimed both that "the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of
young children is of the highest order" and, in the same paragraph, that the state
"[fell] short of identifying a recognized compelling state interest for the purposes of
First Amendmentjurisprudence." Id. at 26 (Griffin,J., concurring and dissenting).
In a case invalidating a lower court's prohibition on the publication of the
names of potential jurors as an impermissible prior restraint on speech, the court
quoted Daily Mail and stated that absent a state interest of the highest order, state
officials could not prevent publication of legally obtained truthful information that
was of public importance. See Commonwealth v. Genovese, 487 A.2d 364, 367 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985). The court also noted that because the names of the jurors were
available to any member of the public that attended the trial, there was no compelling state interest to protect the privacy of the jury and that a prior restraint on the
media was not an appropriately tailored means of protecting the privacy of the jurors. See id. at 368-69.
141 See Minneapolis Star, 360 N.W.2d at 435-36
(invoking strict scrutiny standard of
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982), and the highest order
standard of Daily Mail to invalidate a prior restraint on publishing the name of a juvenile offender, noting that no "compelling" interest was served by the prohibition);
State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (invoking Yoderto find that
"[a] compelling interest encompasses 'only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served .... ') (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
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highest order"'42 or means that 43are the least restrictive alternative to
serve the government's interest.
In some cases, such as those involving claims of an impairment
of religious free exercise, a confusion of state interest of the highest
order and strict scrutiny is probably the result of the Supreme
Court's own vacillations regarding the appropriate standard to apply,
from Yoder's original use of the "highest order" language to cases that
apply a traditional strict scrutiny framework to religious exercise
cases.'
In the area of freedom of association, the joint use of the
142

See North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518, 526 (E.D. Cal.

1988) ("[T]he licensure requirement of the Child Care Facilities Act is designed to
protect the health and safety of children receiving care outside their home. Without
hesitation, the court finds this to be a compelling state interest of the highest order."); People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 420 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (applying North
Valley's "compelling state interest of the highest order" standard).
143 See Miller, 538 N.W.2d at 577-78. The
Miller court applied Yoder and declared
that "[p]ublic safety and the protection of human life is a state interest of the highest order." Id. at 578. The court went on, however, to speak in terms of traditional
strict scrutiny analysis: "The existence ... of a compelling state interest does not
mean that no constitutional violation has occurred. To survive strict scrutiny, the
State must also show that the .. . statute is the least restrictive alternative." Id.; cf.
Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Westhafer, 570 F. Supp. 1447, 1448 (S.D. Ind.
1983) (holding that a state statute was constitutionally sound "if it, first, satisfies a
state interest of the highest order and, second, is narrowly tailored to serve that interest in the manner least restrictive of a free press"), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
1
Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.") with Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 141-42 (1987) (applying strict scrutiny to a claimed impairment of religious free
exercise), Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (same), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405
(1963) (same); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728-32 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See generally Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause
- Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 265 (1982).
Many courts addressing religious free exercise claims have invoked a variety of
phrases to describe the magnitude of the interest the state must assert before it may
impair religious liberty and the level of scrutiny to which such actions will be held.
See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d
184, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that eradicating discrimination was a "compelling
state interest of the highest order" but refusing to apply Title VII to a church's hiring decisions regarding its minister as an "'inroad on religious liberty' [that was] too
substantial to be permissible"); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E.
Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 946 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that before it may impair
the free exercise of religion, the government must demonstrate that "it is the least
restrictive alternative means of achieving some compelling state interest;" that "it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest;" and that it must have a
.state interest of the highest order ...not otherwise served") (internal quotations
and citations omitted); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,
772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that eliminating discrimination is a
compelling state interest of the highest order, but refusing to intrude in the
church's selection of spiritual leaders on First Amendment grounds); North Valley
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seemingly disparate standards stems directly from the Supreme
45
Court's own conflation of language in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.1
In Roberts, the Court melded the phrases into a hybrid, proclaiming
that state civil rights laws aimed at eradicating discrimination in public accommodations "plainly serve[] compelling state interests of the
highest order."''
This language, regrettably, has been repeated in a
generation of post-Roberts cases that have similarly endeavored to resolve claims that imposition of state anti-discrimination legislation
trammeled free-association
rights and that have invoked the Roberts
4 7
language and holding.
Baptist Church, 696 F. Supp. at 526 (finding the state's interest to be "a compelling
state interest of the highest order"); People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 420
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (applying North Valley's "compelling state interest of the highest order" standard).
145 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
146 Id. at 624. The Roberts Court recognized
the right to expressive association,
but said "[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."
Id. at 623. The Court concluded that the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sex, required admission of women to the chapters of the Jaycees within the state. See id. at 626. In
characterizing the governmental interest implicated by such anti-discrimination legislation, the Court stated: "[T]he Act reflects the state's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order." Id. at 624.
147 See Hurley v. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 580
(1995); New York State Clubs Ass'n v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988); Board of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (applying
Roberts and finding that any infringement of expressive freedom is justified by the
promotion of the compelling state interest of the highest order in ending discrimination against women); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1280 (7th Cir.
1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts and arguing that exempting the Boy
Scouts from a public accommodations law as a private entity would allow indiscriminate discrimination and thereby fail to serve the state's compelling interest of the
highest order); Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1389
(D.N.J. 1986) (noting that eliminating sex discrimination is a state interest of the
highest order such that a state law requiring the admission of women into an allmale club did not violate the members' freedom of association under the First
Amendment), rev'd, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the organization
was not a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the statute,
thereby avoiding the constitutional issue); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am.,
Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (Conn.
1987) (noting that eradicating discrimination is a compelling state interest of the
highest order, but failing to apply the public accommodations law to require the Boy
Scouts to accept a woman as a scoutmaster); Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown
Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 32, 45 (D.C. 1987) (citing the
"highest order" standards used in both Yoder and Roberts and concluding that "the
District of Columbia's stake in eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is
one such interest" such that it may, to a limited degree, trump the right to religious
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But while Roberts does use the language "compelling state interests of the highest order," that is not actually the standard the Court
applied in deciding the case. Rather, the Court concluded that enforcing a state civil rights law to require admission of women to the
Jaycees did not unconstitutionally impair the expressive rights of the
male members of the Jaycees because the law was unrelated to the
suppression of ideas and was the least restrictive means to serve the
state's interest in eradicating discrimination against women.'" Accordingly, application of the law did not impair expressive liberties
nor implicate First Amendment concerns. Since First Amendment
scrutiny was not applied, the Court had no need to invoke a due
process standard based on "compelling" or other governmental interests. Accordingly, the Court's mention of "compelling state interests of the highest order" is dicta that forms no essential part of the
exercise); Metropolitan Dade County Fair Hous. & Employment Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 485 So. 2d 865, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(Schwartz, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts and opining that the state's concern for
the elimination of discrimination was a goal that "'plainly serve[d] compelling state
interests of the highest order"'); Lloyd Lions Club of Portland v. Int'l Ass'n of Lions
Clubs, 724 P.2d 887, 892 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Roberts and applying the
state's public accommodations law to require admission of women into a local Lions
Club chapter).
I" Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29. In analyzing the right to intimate association, the
Court reviewed the areas of personal autonomy and intimacy given constitutional
protection from governmental intrusion, including marriage, childbirth, raising and
educating children, and cohabitation with one's relatives. See id. at 619-20 (citing
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). The court stressed that such associations are
characterized by their small size and proximity to family matters and aspects of one's
personal, private life. See id. at 620. Conversely, the court noted that large scale
business operations or organizations operating in the public sphere are remote from
these areas of privacy and personal intimacy. See id. The Court found thatJaycees
was too large and non-selective an entity, with activities involving many nonmembers, for intimate association to be implicated by its policies and practices. See id. at
621.
Regarding expressive association, the court looked to the constitutional protection extended to group activities, such as the right to worship and the right to work
collectively toward political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural
goals. See id. at 622 (citing NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); In rePrimus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)). While recognizing the right to expressive
association, the Court said the right "is not, however, absolute." See id, at 623. The
Court found "[i] nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted
to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also found that the Jaycees's activities were not
truly expressive in character and that, regardless, slight impairment by a contentneutral law not aimed at the suppression of expression was constitutionally permissible to serve vital governmental interests. See id. at 623.
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Court's holding. Cases in the Roberts line that similarly have upheld
imposition of civil rights laws against free association challenges have
likewise upheld application of the statutes when the laws did not impair expressive activities and, therefore, did not implicate First
Amendment concerns or require invocation of a due process review
standard. 9
While the mixing of phrases in the free exercise and freeassociation contexts may be explainable, the confusion of terms in
many free speech cases involving the media's right to publish the
truth, to be free from prior restraints, and to have access to public information is baffling. Whereas Daily Mail and F/orida Star pronounced a clear rule forbidding punishment or restraint of the media's ability to publish the truth absent a means "narrowly tailored" to
advancing "a state interest of the highest order," lower courts have
often melded this standard with traditional strict scrutiny terminology. Many courts invoke both "compelling" and "highest order" language without regard to their possible differing meanings and without citation to any authority for the hybrid standard.' 50 Most
surprising is the careless manner in which some courts actually do
cite authority for the fused "compelling state interest of the highest
order" standard, yet the controlling cases to which those courts cite
do not themselves invoke, apply, or stand for such a hybrid standard. 151 While it is certainly helpful for a judge to cite some authority
1
See, e.g., New York State Clubs Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13 (finding that application
of
the state's anti-discrimination law would not significantly impair the free association
rights of clubs and club members); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (finding that Rotary is not engaged in political issues,
but is dedicated to humanitarian service projects, which would not be impaired but
might indeed be enhanced by the admission of women as members); Fraternal Order of Eagle, Inc., Tucson Aerie No. 180 v. Tucson, 816 P.2d 255 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991) (upholding an anti-discrimination ordinance applied to a male-only fraternal
organization where the organization's membership is large and non-selective, where
it conducts primarily social activities in public, and where any infringement on the
group's expressive freedom is slight in comparison to the state's interest in eradicating discrimination against women).
U See, e.g., Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 825-26, 828 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (analogizing to FloridaStar, yet declaring that speech restrictions may be
upheld only if, "at a minimum, [they] substantially advance the asserted compelling
interest. . ."), judgment vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Doe v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Comm., 748 F. Supp. 1520, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting
Daily Mails "highest order" standard, but immediately thereafter invalidating the
state's action for its failure to "set forth any compelling interests" sufficient to justify
a restriction on protected speech).
151 See, e.g., State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ind. 1990). The Heltzel court
announced that "the state may not punish or suppress the publication of truthful information without first demonstrating a compelling state interest of the highest order" and cited Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia as the authority for this
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for such pronouncements, it is quite troublesome when, as in these
cases, the authority does not stand for the asserted proposition.
Whether the result of carelessness, confusion, ignorance, or fabrication, many courts are not applying the standards of the state interest
of the highest order doctrine in their pure form but, rather, are
commingling them with the more familiar jurisprudential language
of "compelling state interests" and "least restrictive
means" that tradi52
tionally comprise the strict scrutiny model.
B. ProperApplications and Extension of the Doctrine
Since the promulgation of the state interest of the highest order
doctrine and since its strongest application in FloridaStar, numerous
courts - primarily in cases involving media defendants and efforts to
punish them for reporting truthful, sensitive information whether
through criminal or civil sanction - have properly applied the doctrine and required the state to demonstrate a means most narrowly
tailored to serving a state interest of the highest order before First
Amendment liberties may be impaired. In the free speech arena,
courts also have extended the Florida Star doctrine beyond its quintessential applicability to media defendants to include organizations
and even individuals engaged in constitutionally protected speech.
These cases demonstrate the relevance and vitality of the doctrine
beyond its traditional uses and may have elucidative implications for
standard. Heltze4 552 N.E.2d at 34 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978)).
Landmark, however, said nothing about
"compelling state interests of the highest order." Rather, Landmark declared that a
state's restriction of free speech can only be justified by demonstrating that the
speech presents a "clear and present danger" to the administration of justice. See
Landmark, 435 U.S. at 844; see also Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230, 1235
(Mont. 1993) (quoting Landmark as having used "the most urgent governmental importance" language, although Landmark, in fact, does not use this language). Landmark does not meld the words "compelling" and "highest order" when assessing the
magnitude of the government's interest. See Landmark, 435 U.S. at 844; see also In re
PEPCO Employment Litig., No. 86-0603, 1992 WL 115611 (D.D.C. May 8, 1992). In
PEPCO, the court stated that a confidentiality order forbidding parties to discuss information obtained through the discovery process could not be applied to prevent
disclosure of information obtained from outside sources "absent a compelling state
interest of the highest order." Id. at * 8. In support of its invocation of this standard,
the court cited Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S.
624, 632 (1990) and Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). See id. Butterworth, one of the major cases applying the state interest of the highest order standard, is quite clear in its invocation of just that standard, however, and the case does
not speak of nor search for compelling state interests of the highest order. See Butterworth,
494 U.S. at 632. Likewise, Seattle Times did not speak in terms of state interests of the
highest order, but did uphold a protective order refusing access to pretrial discovery
materials. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37.
152
SeeTRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-6, at 1451 (explaining strict scrutiny review).
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other areas of First. Amendment jurisprudence wherein the doctrine
has not been traditionally applied. The doctrine could resolve conflicts between the government's regulatory interests and the fundamental civil liberties of individuals.
The most common applications of the state interest of the highest order doctrine are in cases involving media defendants, wherein
the doctrine is invoked to protect the media from being punished
for, or prohibited from, publishing truthful information lawfully obtained,5 " absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order' and a means most narrowly tailored toward that end.'55 Primarily, those cases are the direct progeny of Daily Mail and Florida Star
and involve statutes or court orders that endeavor to protect confidentiality interests by prohibiting or punishing publication of the
names or identities of juvenile offenders'6 or rape victims.

5

7

These

Cf Natoli v. Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (finding that
a
newspaper's publication of information obtained from a wiretap was not protected
from civil sanctions under federal wiretap law because the statute was narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest of the highest order and because the information was unlawfully obtained).
1 See, e.g., Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 471 (D.N.H.
1990)
(finding that barring media access to a public accident scene was not narrowly tailored to serving a state interest of the highest order); Upchurch v. New York Times
Co., 431 S.E.2d 558, 561 (S.C. 1993) (" [W]hen a newspaper (1) lawfully obtains (2)
truthful information about (3) a matter of public significance, liability may be imposed only if it serves a need to further a state interest of the highest order."); Fann
v. City of Fairview, 905 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (protecting the media's publication of truthful information it lawfully obtained against a privacy and
tortious conduct lawsuit by a city official and finding that the suit demonstrated no
"need to further a state interest of the highest order by sanctioning [the newspaper]
for its receipt and subsequent publication of this information"); In re Hays v. Marano, 493 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that when a newspaper reported on a matter of public importance and obtained truthful information in a legal, albeit inadvertently released, manner, the state could not impose sanctions
without a need to advance a state interest of the highest order).
15 See, e.g., Jacksonville Television, Inc. v.
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 659 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of children is a state interest of the highest order, but
that prohibiting the broadcast of an interview filmed prior to ajudge's imposition of
a gag order was "simply too tenuous" a means of serving that interest to withstand
First Amendment scrutiny); In re M.B., 484 N.E.2d 1154, 1159-60 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that a protective order prohibiting press attendance and publication related to a juvenile's prosecution hearing was an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech because, although the protection of minors was a state interest of the highest
order, the order was not narrowly tailored when the identity and address of the juvenile had been released prior to the entrance of the protective order).
1% See KGTV Channel 10 v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 188 (Ct. App.
1994) (finding that the state's interest in rehabilitation ofjuvenile offenders did not
justify restraining the media's right to publish the name of ajuvenile offender that it
already received and aired prior to the court's order); M.B., 484 N.E.2d at 1159-60
153
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are the easy applications of the doctrine because they are so directly
and factually on point with clear Supreme Court precedents; however, courts have also extended the doctrine's protection to many different subjects of media scrutiny."ss In cases involving media defendants, courts are more likely to invoke the state interest of the
highest order doctrine and, thanks to the clearly analogous precedent, are apt to apply it correctly, requiring that the state must demonstrate a need to serve a state interest of the highest order and a

(nullifying a protective order that precluded the press from attending prosecution
hearings regarding a minor charged with abusing an infant and prohibited publication of the juvenile's name as an unconstitutional prior restraint); Minneapolis Star
and Tribune Co. v. Schmidt, 360 N.W.2d 433, 435-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(invalidating a prior restraint on publishing the name of ajuvenile offender because
no "compelling" interest was served by the prohibition); Edward A. Sherman Publ'g
Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1257 (R.I. 1982) (finding that a court order barring
a newspaper from attending a juvenile proceeding based on a prior publication of
the minor's name was an unconstitutional punishment for the publication of legally
obtained data of public concern absent a need to advance a state interest of the
highest order); State ex reL Times and Democrat, 274 S.E.2d 910, 911 (S.C. 1981)
(invalidating a state law that prohibited the press from publishing the name or likeness of ajuvenile charged with a crime because the state could not prohibit the publication of legally obtained truthful information without a need to further a state interest of the highest order). But see In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1057-58 (Ill.
1992)
(upholding a juvenile court's exclusion of a reporter from a juvenile hearing when
the proceedings were closed by court rules and thus the press had no absolute right
to attend them - finding that, in this circumstance, the state's interest in protecting
the rights ofjuveniles overrode the press's rights under the First Amendment).
157 See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271,
275 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a television station could not be held liable for tortious interference
with the privacy of a rape victim for publication of her first name, details of the rape,
and a picture of her residence because the rape was newsworthy and the state's interest could be served by alternative means); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d
471, 475 (Tex. 1995) (invalidating lower court's finding that whether the identity of
a rape victim was a matter of public concern or was lawfully obtained was ajury question and invoking instead the Florida Star standard to protect the media from the
chilling effect of having to contemplate the impact that each newsworthy truthful
report could have on victims involved); State v. Globe Communications, 648 So. 2d
110, 112 (Fla. 1994) (invalidating application of state's rape shield statute to protect
media from liability for publishing the name of the rape victim in the William Kennedy Smith trial when the media had lawfully obtained the name through its own
investigations); Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Tatum, 436 S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ga. 1993)
(reversing, under Florida Star and the First Amendment, a damages award for a victim of attempted rape who shot and killed her assailant and whose name was reported in newspapers in contravention of the state rape shield statute).
15 See Connell 733 F. Supp. at 471 (access to accident site); Lence v. Hagadone
Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Mont. 1993) (ethics investigation of attorney), overruled by Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (1995); In re Hays,
493 N.Y.S.2d at 906 (trial of former New York Yankees baseball playerJoe Pepitone);
Upchurch, 431 S.E.2d at 561 (suspected cocaine-related death); Fann, 905 S.W.2d at
172 (investigation of city official).
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means most narrowly tailored to effecting that interest. 9 The doctrine has even been extended to protect the media from liability
when publishing information that may have originally been unlawfully obtained as long as the information came into the hands of the
media lawfully.' 60

Compare generally Worrell Newspapers of Ind. v. Weshafer, 570 F. Supp.
1447
(S.D. Ind. 1983) (finding that an Indiana statute that prohibited the release of information or indictments that were sealed by court order served a state interest of
the highest order and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest with the least possible burden on the press and thus withstood the media's challenge on First
Amendment grounds), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 469 U.S. 1200
(1985), with cases cited supra notes 153-58 (generally applying the doctrine correctly
by finding that state efforts to sanction the media for publishing truthful information lawfully obtained were constitutionally invalid because they were not narrowly
tailored to serving a state interest of the highest order).
160 See Peavy v. New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532, 540
(N.D. Tex. 1997). At issue
in Peavy were extreme racist and profane statements made by Peavy, a Dallas school
board member, regarding his fellow board members, school officials, district parents, and schoolchildren of African-American descent. See id. at 533. The statements were illegally wiretapped by an unknown individual in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2510 (Title III). See id. Audio tapes of Peavy's statements were anonymously delivered to school board members, who then read a transcript of the inflammatory tape
into the record of a public school board meeting at which Peavy was not in attendance. See id. at 533-34. Thus, the statements made their way into the public transcripts of the meeting and a local weekly newspaper, The Dallas Obseryer, obtained a
copy of the transcript and published it in full. See id. Portions of the information
were subsequently republished in the Dallas Morning News and The New York Times.
See id. at 535. Peavy sued the local newspaper and its editor, asserting claims of
common law invasion of privacy, violations of two state codes, and violation of the
federal wiretap statute, Title III. See id. at 536-37. The newspaper asserted a First
Amendment defense to the wiretap claim. See id. at 537-38. The district court analyzed the wiretap cause of action within the Daily Mail and Florida Star framework,
stating that the media could not be punished for publishing truthful information
lawfully obtained absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. See
id. at 538 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail,
443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979)). The court reasoned that "the privacy interest at stake here
is less than compelling, [while] the public interest in the publication of these transcripts, on the other hand, is great." Id. at 539. The court asserted that the privacy
interests of public figures or private individuals involved in public issues frequently
must give way to the public's right to know and the media's free press rights under
the First Amendment. See id. at 539-40 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 334 (1974) (private individuals); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964) ("[Wlhere the criticism is of
public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the
dissemination of truth.")). Additionally, the court found that even if the wiretapped
information was originally obtained unlawfully, that unlawful taint was purged once
the information was read into the public record at the school board meeting. See id.
at 540. Thus, the information was lawfully obtained by the newspaper and the newspaper had a constitutional right to publish the information because it was clearly of
public importance. See id.
159
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Outside of the realm of media defendants, however, the state interest of the highest order doctrine has been invoked in a surprisingly small number of cases to safeguard First Amendment liberties.
Of the few courts willing to mold the doctrine to protect analogous
speech interests of non-media defendants, some have logically extended the doctrine's protective mantle to secure the speech interests of organizations engaged in communicating information of public concern, including a credit reporting agency'6 ' and a tenant's
organization. 2 One dissenting state supreme court justice even argued that the standard should be applied to protect the expressive
rights of a labor union engaged in a protest work stoppage. 63
Only a handful of courts have made the reasonable extension of
the doctrine to protect the First Amendment interests of individuals
faced with governmental efforts to suppress or sanction the content
of their speech.' 64 Among those protected individuals were the plaintiffs in a class action discrimination lawsuit who opposed their employer's efforts to seal from public view all documents related to the
case.' In a recent high profile case involving two United States conSee U.D. Registry, Inc. v. California, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232 (Ct. App. 1995)
S61
(applying the doctrine to protect a credit reporting agency's freedom of speech
about a potential tenant's history of detainer actions because the statute under scrutiny prohibited dissemination of information that was made publicly available by the
state itself in ' ourt records).
162 See Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324,
1335-36 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (applying the Florida Star standard to protect a neighborhood tenants'
association from liability for publicizing a landlord's address and property holdings
since such information was truthful, lawfully obtained from public records, and of
public concern).
I&I See Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d 1186, 1196-97
(Pa.
1992) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority for ordering an end to a labor
union's work stoppage as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and declaring that only a state interest of the highest order can justify interference with the union's free speech interest in striking).
164 See, e.g., Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395 (8th
Cir. 1997). In Coplin, the court analyzed an individual's First Amendment claim under the state interest of the highest order standard. See id. at 1404 (citing Florida
Star, 491 U.S. at 541). Of note, however, Coplin was himself a media plaintiff as the
host of a cable television call-in talk show, which was suspended in the wake of community complaints regarding the revelations on the program of sexual information
about individuals who were not public figures. See id. at 1398-1400. The court invoked Florida Star and remanded the case to assure that the cable television access
board, a government actor, was not censuring publication of private facts that were
already in the public domain, hence assuring that the suspension was narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the highest order. See id. at 1404.
165 See In re PEPCO Employment Litig., No. 86-0603, 1992 WL
115611 (D.D.C.
May 8, 1992). In PEPCO, the court stated that a confidentiality order forbidding parties to discuss information obtained through the discovery process could not be applied to prevent disclosure of information obtained from outside sources "absent a
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gressmen, Boehner v. McDermott,' 6 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia weighed the privacy interests of one congressman against the free speech interests of the other and ruled that
expressive liberties won out over the privacy and governmental confidentiality interests protected by a federal wiretap statute. 67
'
The
Boehner court applied FloridaStar's state interest of the highest order
doctrine to protect the free speech interests of the congressman who
disclosed information originally obtained through an illegal wiretap
but legally obtained by him. The court held that the statute's privacy
protection interests did not meet the highest order standard when
the information was of public concern, was truthful, and was lawfully
obtained by the defendant.8
The dearth ofjudicial opinions applying the state interest of the
highest order standard to First Amendment free speech claims asserted by groups and individuals is surprising - indeed, inexplicable
because state and federal courts have clear guidance demonstrating the applicability of the standard to assess the free speech interests
of individuals, guidance from none other than the highest court in
compelling state interest of the highest order." Id. at *8.
1
No. CLV. 98-594, 1998 WL 436897 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998).
167 See id. at *7. At issue in Boehner was a tape made of a conversation involving
several Republican congressmen regarding the House Ethics Committee's investigation of the activities of then-Speaker Newt Gingrich. See id. at *1. Two Florida residents intercepted a cellular telephone transmission involving Gingrich and Republican Reps. John Boehner and Dick Armey. See id. The couple discussed the
potentially damaging tape with Rep. Kay Thurman, a Democrat, who in turn discussed it with Minority Whip David Bonior and eventually advised the interceptors to
deliver the tape to Rep. James McDermott, a member of the House Ethics Committee. See idi McDermott forwarded copies of the tape to The New York Times, The AtlantaJournhl-Constitution,and Roll Call See id. The Times broke the story on January
10, 1997 on page one. See id. The couple was eventually charged with a misdemeanor violation of unlawful interception of a cellular transmission and each was
fined $500. See id. at *2. Boehner filed suit against McDermott, alleging violation of
a federal wiretapping statute for his allegedly having knowingly disclosed an illegally
intercepted communication. See id. The court considered varying levels of scrutiny
to apply to the competing privacy and free speech interests at issue and adopted
Florida Star as the controlling precedent because the information in McDermott's
hands was truthful, lawfully obtained, and of public interest, despite the unlawful
genesis of the tape when in the hands of the Florida couple. See id. at *4-7.
168 See id. at *7.
The district court derided Rep. McDermott's choice "so eagerly
[to] seek to capitalize on the skullduggery of would-be party operatives to win petty,
partisan victories in the press," but nevertheless found that the Congressman's actions were constitutionally protected. Id. The court concluded: "The First
Amendment is largely blind to motives, however, and it offers protection not only to
the noble but also to the ignoble. Thus, Rep. McDermott's actions are protected
under the Amendment, and the Court must grant his motion to dismiss." Id. Of
interest, the court questioned the ethics of McDermott's actions and noted that
when his use of the illicitly taped conversations became public, he resigned from the
House Ethics Committee. See id. n.9.
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the land. In two opinions written this decade by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court put government actors to the test of
demonstrating a need to further a state interest of the highest order
and a means most narrowly tailored toward advancing that interest
before the government could justify impairment of the content of the
free speech liberties of an individual.'6'
In one of these cases, United States v. Aguilar,'" the Supreme
Court reviewed the conviction of a federal judge for illegally disclosing the existence of an FBI wiretap and for obstruction of justice for
7
lying to federal agents investigating an embezzlement conviction.'1
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the obstruction of justice count, but reinstated the conviction for violating
the federal wiretap statute. ' n In analyzing the wiretap conviction, the
Court applied Daily Mail to Judge Aguilar's claimed First Amendment
defense ' " and acknowledged that "the government may not generally
restrict individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes
into their hands in the absence of a 'state interest of the highest order."" 74 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the wiretap statute does
not broadly sanction all those who disclose lawfully obtained knowledge of a wiretap, but is sufficiently narrowly tailored such that it imposes liability "only upon those who disclose wiretap information 'in
order to obstruct, impede, or prevent' interception of the communications that are the focus of the probe. 75 Beyond this narrow impingement on speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the state interest of the highest order doctrine and reasoned that the
government may at times impose "special duties of nondisclosure"
upon "officials in sensitive confidential positions" such as federal
judges, such that an impairment of ajudge's First Amendment rights
is justified even where it would not be so for the rights of "a member of
the general public who happened to lawfully acquire possession of in-

169 See generally United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); Butterworth v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
170 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
1
See id. at 595. An en banc hearing of the Ninth Circuit reversed both convictions. See id.
17
See id. at 606.
173 See id. at 605. Aguilar urged a more narrow reading
of the wiretap statute such
that his conduct would not fall within its proscription since the wiretap had already
expired at the time he disclosed it. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist opined, "We see
no necessity for such a restrictive construction of the statute." Id.
174 Id. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (emphasis
added)).
175 Id. at 605 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
2232(c) (1994)).

1244

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 29:1197

formation about the wiretap." 76 Citing the need to "preserve the integrity of the court" and to the higher duty imposed upon sensitive
government officials who voluntarily assumed a position of confidentiality, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the Government's interest" in maintaining the secrecy of sensitive wiretap information "is
quite sufficient to justify" application of the statute to a federal judge,
"without
any artificial narrowing because of First Amendment con177
cerns."
In the other opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist in this vein, Butterworth v. Smith, 7 1 the Supreme Court considered the First Amendment rights of a former grand jury witness to speak about the subject
matter of the grand jury investigation after the completion of the
proceedings.'7
A Florida statute prohibited grand jury witnesses
from ever disclosing their testimony,ss and the witness sued to have
the statute declared an unconstitutional impairment of free speech
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.'8' ChiefJustice Rehnquist
analyzed that claim within the Daily Mail framework and declared
that a state may not sanction an individual'sspeech regarding lawfully
obtained truthful information, viz., the content of speech, absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order.ss Noting that
the speech at issue in the case concerned alleged governmental improprieties - "speech which has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment "1 " - the Court placed the
onus on the state to justify its restriction on speech by requiring the
state to meet the standards of the state interest of the highest order

76
77

Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 605-06 (emphasis added).
Id.

178

494 U.S. 624 (1990).

17

See id. at 626-28. The grand jury witness, Michael Smith, was a newspaper re-

porter for the Charlotte Herald-News in Charlotte County, Florida. See id. at 626. After
completion of the grand jury proceedings, Smith decided to write a news story, and
perhaps a book, about the subject matter of the grand jury investigation, including
therein his own testimony and his experiences as a witness. See id. at 628. In the
course of the investigation, he gained information regarding improprieties in the

State Attorney's Office and County Sheriff's Office. See id. at 626.
180See id. at 626-27. With limited exceptions, the Florida statute at issue forever
barred a grand jury witness from communicating the contents of the witness' own
testimony. See id. at 627.

1l1 See id. at 629. Smith sought a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality
plus
to forestall his prosecution. See id.
182 an injunction
..
See id. at 632 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).

Id. (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838
(1978)).
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doctrine.'" Finding that the state's confidentiality interests regarding
grand jury proceedings did not justify "a permanent ban" on disclosures even after completion of the grand jury proceedings, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the asserted state interests were not directly served by its statute and thus could not justify the impairment
of the speech interests of grand jury witnesses. 8 5 Because the state
was unable to demonstrate that its restriction on grand jury witnesses
was narrowly tailored to advance a state interest of the highest order,
the Court struck down the statute insofar as it operated to bar indefinitely the communication of truthful information lawfully obtained
by grandjury witnesses.ss
In both Aguilar and Butterworth, the Supreme Court made clear
that the heavy state interest of the highest order doctrine stood as a
protection of the content of the speech of individuals, not just of the
media. It is puzzling that many lower courts have not frequently followed this jurisprudence and applied the doctrine to governmental
efforts to impair the speech interests of individuals as well as the media.187 The Supreme Court also has never indicated that the Daily
Mail or FloridaStar applications of the state interest of the highest order doctrine should not be extended beyond the context of juvenile
offenders and rape victims to include speech involving other subject
matters; quite the opposite, in fact. In Easton Publishing Co. v. Boettger,' for example, a case involving publication of gambling-related
information obtained from a wiretap, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's imposition of civil
liability against a newspaper for publication of the information and
remanded the case with explicit instructions that the state court reconsider its opinion in light of FloridaStar.'89 The precedent is clear;
184
185

See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632.
See id. The state had asserted interests in needing to preserve confidentiality

in order to apprehend suspects still at large, to prevent subornation of witnesses expected to testify at later trials, to protect witnesses from later retribution, and to prevent intimidation of grand jury witnesses. See id at 633-34. The court found that
such interests are not persuasive when the grand jury investigation is over, noting:
[W]e do not believe those interests warrant a permanent ban on the
disclosure by a witness of his own testimony once a grand jury has been
discharged. Some of these interests are not served at all by the Florida
ban on disclosure, and those that are served are not sufficient to sustain the statute.
Id. at 632.
18

187

See id. at 635-36.
See infra Part VI.

IN 493 U.S. 885 (1989).
9
See Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 713 (Pa. 1991) (Boettger I) (noting that
the United States Supreme Court vacated the state court's judgment and remanded
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the indications from the Supreme Court are strong; the dearth of
application among the lower courts is maddening. Aguilar and Butterworth are especially poignant because they both deal with individuals as participants in the judicial process and the tension that comes
about when First Amendment speech issues arise within a judicial setting.
C. Simplicity: The Promise of the State Interest of the Highest Order
Doctrine
The application of the state interest of the highest order doctrine offers excellent protection for expressive liberties in the face of
routine governmental operations that may at times interfere with an
individual's protected rights. As Part II of this Article demonstrates,
the government must prove that it has a great need to interfere with
an individual's liberty in a specific and focused manner before the
individual's liberty gives way to the governmental interest. As the
discussion in this Part demonstrates, the power of this doctrine has
been thwarted in the past decade due to inconsistent and often inappropriate application of the doctrine. The state interest of the highest order doctrine is not strict scrutiny; it is not intermediate scrutiny;
it is not a time, place, and manner analysis. What the doctrine offers
is a strong alternative by which courts should judge government action that restricts the content of First Amendment expressive liberties.
The state interest of the highest order doctrine is an ideal tool to
serve the needs of individuals and government, because it not only
endeavors to secure constitutional liberties, but it allows for an override in situations of the utmost state interest. When the government
seeks to impair the content of an individual's expressive liberty in a
particular environment, the doctrine requires the state to explain
why that particular impairment of that particular individual's words
in that particular environment is necessary to save the state's existence. Such a doctrine is the quintessence of the Bill of Rights, which
the case for consideration in light of Florida Star). On remand, the Pennsylvania
court in Boettger II found no liability against the media. See id. at 717-18. The court
deemed that the information at issue, because it dealt with a crime - gambling was not the sort of information protected by a state interest of the highest order. See
id. at 718. The dissent faulted the majority's reliance on the nature of the communication as the determining factor regarding whether a state interest of the highest
order existed. See id. at 723 (Zappala, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the
proper inquiry is not into the "content of the conversation" but into whether
"interception and disclosure" of the conversation occurred. See id. The dissent rejected the majority's "hindsight" view of the character of the information and stated
that the interception itself implicates a state interest of the highest order in protecting privacy. See id. at 722-24 (ZappalaJ., dissenting).
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secures and defends the rights of individuals against the government. The onus properly belongs on the government when its actions have negative consequences for the exercise of expressive liberties. This is the achievement of the state interest of the highest order
doctrine.
More than this, the doctrine brings a promise of simplicity. By
consistently requiring courts to force the government to justify its
impairments of First Amendment liberties under the doctrine's standards, courts will be spared the increasingly tortured analyses that
have weighed down First Amendment jurisprudence. As discussed in
Part V of this Article, First Amendment jurisprudence is greatly in
need of such a simplification, especially in areas such as media access
to courtroom proceedings and the expressive rights of provocative
speakers. The state interest of the highest order doctrine could
prove to be the unifying agent that will end the erratic jurisprudence
that has bogged down First Amendment law - giving courts and litigants, the media and individuals, the government and provocative
speakers, consistent standards upon which they can rely in resolving
clashes between governmental actions and individual constitutional
liberties. As the discussions in Parts V and VI demonstrate, too often
the First Amendment's protection of expressive liberties is sacrificed
at the altar of the justice system when those interests clash with the
government's interests in administering the justice system or in silencing unpopular or unwelcome speech. Such a state of affairs is an
affront to the First Amendment and demonstrates the need to unify,
simplify, and fortify First Amendmentjurisprudence.
V.

AN ERRATIC JURISPRUDENCE PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION
FOR FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES

The intended reach of the Constitution's protection of free
speech has been debated by generations of scholars and jurists who
have advanced competing jurisprudential theories to address the
First Amendment's speech clause.' 9° The Supreme Court has never
held the First Amendment's protection of free speech to be an absolute guarantee, 0 ' but has carved out exceptions from its grasp and
promulgated varying standards by which courts should assess its
19 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203 (1994)
(chronicling the competing theories of free speech jurisprudence in the past century).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) ("[1It is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.").
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reach. Among the forms of speech falling outside the Amendment's
realm of protection are obscenity,192 defamation,'93 fighting words,"94
treason,'9 5 perjury,'1 6 and incitement to imminent lawlessness. 9

7

The

analytic framework for speech cases includes different standards for
public versus nonpublic forums, as well as time, place, and manner
rules,'" imposition of laws of general application that may impact
upon speech,2 00 and balancing tests when speech interests and other
rights clash.20 ' The varying tests invoked and standards to be applied
in speech cases can produce dramatically different results depending
on which test the reviewing court decides to use, and the reasons underlying the choices are not always clear.02 The Supreme Court's frac1W See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (laying out a threshold
test to
determine whether speech is obscene and thus not protected by the First Amendment); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (upholding the government's power to ban mailing of obscene materials); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscene speech receives no constitutional protection).
193 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (stating that defamation of purely private individuals may fall outside of the First Amendment's protection).
9
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (holding that "fighting words" that inflict
harm
by their very utterance receive no constitutional protection).
195 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961).
196 See LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 756 (1998) (citing
Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 866 (1966)).
197 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(finding that the government may sanction incitement of imminent lawless action that is likely to produce
such action without offending the First Amendment).
198 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
118 S. Ct. 1633, 1641-43
(1998) (recapping the Supreme Court's forum analysis standards for speech rights
in public, designated public, and nonpublic forums); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (laying out guidelines to analyze
whether a public or designated public forum has been created versus a nonpublic

forum).

See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (allowing for reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech and speech-related activities if the
government's regulations are content-neutral, if they are necessary to advance a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and if the
incidental burden on speech interests is no greater than absolutely necessary).
200 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press does not exempt the media
from laws of general applicability, such as imposition of liability based on a promissorZlestoppel claim).
See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
202 Compare, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. 663, with FloridaStar, 491 U.S. 524. Had the Cohen Court applied the rule from FloridaStar,as the dissent urged, it is clear that the
media would have been protected from liability. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 676
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Compare also, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215 (1972) and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992). Had the Employment Divi199
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tured speech jurisprudence has become increasingly tortured and
confusing as a result of these many standards and differing modes of
analysis. °3
One of the most troublesome areas of speech-related litigation
of late has been media access to judicial proceedings and court
documents, as judges have become increasingly wary about the presence of the press in the courtroom and have curtailed media access
in the name of protecting the fair-trial rights of defendants and the
privacy of victims and juveniles, and -

allegedly -

promoting the

efficient administration ofjustice.m Courts inexplicably utilize differing tests to analyze governmental efforts to punish the media for
publishing lawfully obtained truth than for restrictions on media access to courtrooms and on the media's ability lawfully to gather truthful information.
When it comes to media access to courtrooms and court records,
judges apply different standards for criminal and civil cases. The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that in criminal trials, all
documents and proceedings must be open to the public and to the
press.2 5 State efforts to close criminal proceedings, for example, in
the interest of protecting privacy and rehabilitation interests regarding a juvenile sexual assault victim, have been stricken by the Court
in the name of the media's First Amendment right to access.2l The
Court has also ruled that jury selection in criminal trials must be
open to public scrutiny and to media coverage.20 7 These rulings
mandating press access to the courtroom may seem to augur well for
recognition of the media's rights in the courtroom, but several other
rulings do not bode well for media scrutiny of judicial proceedings.
For example, a judge may elect to close certain documents or proceedings, such as pretrial proceedings, if the judge believes there is a

sion Court applied the protection for free exercise of religion against state coercion
as embodied in Yoder and, a generation later, in Lee, rather than holding that laws of
general applicability that burden religious exercise only incidentally are constitutionally permissible, the Court would have reached a different result.
203 See generally Daniel A. Farber & John
E. Nowak, The MisleadingNature of Public
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv.
1219 (1984).
W4 See infra
Part VI.
_S
See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
See Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)

(striking down a Massachusetts statute that permitted a judge to close court proceedings involving ajuvenile sex assault victim and noting that such a restriction must be
"necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and ... narrowly tailored to
serve that interest").
2
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
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substantial threat to the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial 2 8
Additionally, if the safety of jurors is an issue, courts may elect to impanel the jury in secrecy and maintain the anonymity of jurors if the
judge states the reasons for doing so on the record.2 These decisions allow judges leeway to decide that proceedings must be closed,
and the media only rarely will stomach the cost and delay required to
litigate such matters.
In civil cases, there is greater room for closure of proceedings,
documents, and settlement terms, despite rather strong language
from the Supreme Court assuring the media and the public their
rights of access. n Judges and parties to civil cases tend to view publicity as a threat to settlement potential and thus seek to keep as
much information secret as possible.
Even when the media has a
full right of access to court proceedings, judges may refrain from allowing access to pretrial proceedings, leaving the media to report on
a trial while ignorant of materials contained in pretrial discovery.
Too many judges abuse the discretion they have to seal court
documents and close court proceedings and end up sealing and closing more than is required for maintaining secrecy for the duration of
the issue's public interest.1 4 Beyond the instances in which courts
208

See Rosalind C. Truitt, Court Watch; After O.J., JournalistsFightfor Access to Sealed

Court Documents and Closed Proceedings,PRESSTIME, July/Aug. 1998, at 32 (noting that
despite a high-profile victim, the trial stemming from the murder of entertainer Bill
Cosby's son, Ennis, People v. Markhasev, in California Superior Court attracted little
media attention and did not warrant restrictions on the media).
20
See United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. Colo. 1996)
(impaneling an anonymous jury).
21 See Truitt, supra note 208 (quoting New York Times assistant general
counsel
George Freeman as stating, "Unless the media is willing to spend a lot of time and
money challenging each and every closure, a lot of this information is sealed.").
211 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("[T]he
courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records
and documents, including judicial records and documents.").
212 See United States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129,
136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
("In a perfect world, the public would be kept abreast of all developments in the settlement discussions of lawsuits of public interest. In our world, such disclosure
would.., result in no settlement discussions and no settlements.").
21s See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)
(upholding a trial
court's order forbidding a newspaper from publishing information obtained
through pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding).
214 See Truitt, supra note 208.
Truitt chronicles several recent cases in which
judges have clamped down on free speech interests all in the name of the fair and
efficient administration of justice. See id. For example, a Pennsylvania state court
withheld court documents from the press during the duration of a criminal trial,
and a review panel upheld the judge's order. See id. Moreover, the review panel refused three newspapers the right to appeal the ruling until after the criminal trial
was over, when the material would be of diminished interest to the newspapers and
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have been able to order proceedings closed and thereby prevent media access to information, there have been disturbing cases in which
trial judges have endeavored, usually unsuccessfully, to proscribe
publication 21151
of information the media had obtained through open
.
proceedings or otherwise from public records.1
The Supreme
Court has a long record of refusing to tolerate efforts to sanction the
media by impeding their ability to report on matters learned at an
open court proceeding or through lawful research means.1 7 Courts
have been overturned when they have tried to suppress publication
of information such as the names or identities of jurors when that information was readily available in an open courtroom. 218
There are certainly legitimate restrictions on speech in a courtroom setting that must be made to assure fair and facile adjudication
and that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. For instance,
bans on juror statements during a trial itself directly serve the signifitheir readers. See id. A Second Circuit panel upheld a trial court's order sealing
transcripts in boxing promoter Don King's 1995 fraud. trial that ended in a mistrial.
See id. As ajustification for the order, the trial judge cited "press excess." See id.
215
See KGTV Channel 10 v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 188 (Ct. App.
1994) (invalidating a trial court's injunction preventing a newspaper from printing
the name and likeness of a juvenile murder suspect after the suspect's name and
identity were reported in an open courtroom at a public hearing, noting that the
media has a statutory right to attend the hearing and a constitutional right to report
what it learrs there).
26 See In re Hays v. Marano, 493 N.Y.S.2d
904, 906 (App. Div. 1985). In a case
stemming from a narcotics trial involving former New York Yankees baseball player
Joe Pepitone, the trial court ordered a New York Daily News reporter to refrain from
printing grand jury testimony excerpts from the trial, after the testimony was inadvertently placed in the public record in order to avoid complications in the trial. See
id. at 905-06. Citing to Daily Mail, the appellate court determined that when a newspaper reported on a matter of public importance and obtained truthful information
in a legal manner, the state could not impose sanctions without a need to advance a
state interest of the highest order. See id. at 906.
217 See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("Those
who see and hear
what transpired can report it with impunity.").
218
See State ex rel. National Broad. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Lake County,
556 N.E.2d 1120, 1129 (Ohio 1990). In the Ohio NBC case, the media appealed a
court order that prohibited the publication of the names and photographs ofjurors.
See id. at 1121. The state supreme court found that the trial court's proscription of
the media's ability to air the names and photographs ofjurors in a murder trial was
an unconstitutional prior restraint. See id. at 1130. The reviewing court noted that
the trial judge failed to hold a hearing to determine the impact that reporting the
information would have on the defendant or the trial and failed to consider any less
restrictive alternatives. See id. at 1129. Because the names ofjurors would be available to anyone who attended the trial, the court said that the judge was not permitted to proscribe the ability of the press to publish that information. See id. Quoting
Daily Mail the court held that state officials may not punish legally obtained truthful
information of public importance unless the penalty advanced a state interest of the
highest order. See id.
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cant governmental interest in fairness. Court orders that silence ex
parte statements by lawyers and judges are likewise justified by the
need to assure fairness to the parties and efficiency in administration.2 ' 9 But secretive court proceedings regarding attorney or judicial
discipline are not justified once the allegations have been part of a
public record; and the American trend is now away from secrecy in
such disciplinary proceedings.
It is in criminal trials that the conflict between the press's and
the public's First Amendment rights to know and the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is most poignantly illustrated. The Supreme Court, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,2'
endeavored to strike a balance between these competing rights in the
context of a multiple murder trial, which had attracted immense media coverage in a small rural community.2 ' To prevent prejudicial
publicity that might taint the opinions of prospective jurors, the trial
court issued a gag order prohibiting the media or anyone in attendance at oral arguments, pretrial hearings, or other proceedings which were open to the public and attended by the press - from releasing or disseminating "in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony given or evidence adduced."23 The Nebraska Supreme Court
modified the lower court's order, but still prohibited the media from
reporting on the existence and nature of any confessions made by
the defendant to police or other parties, except any admissions made
directly to the press, and other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused's role in the murders.2 4
219 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1070 (1991). In Gentile, the Supreme Court upheld the Nevada Bar's rule prohibiting lawyers from making extra-

judicial statements that a reasonable person would expect to be communicated in
the press if the lawyer reasonably should know that the statement will have a substan-

tial likelihood of materially prejudicing a court proceeding. See id. at 1075. However, the Court found that the state's application of the "substantial likelihood of
prejudice" rule was void for vagueness in that attorneys could not be sure whether
their conduct fell within the proscription. See id. at 1048.
2"

See Cynthia Gray, AJS Adopts Policy on Confidentiality, 17-4JuD. CONDUcT REP. 10,

10 (1996). The American Judicature Society (AJS), a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to promoting judicial ethics and efficiency, favors making public all judi-

cial disciplinary proceedings once a formal charge has been filed against a judge.
See id. According to information released by the AJS, only two states and the District

of Columbia retain confidentiality ofjudicial disciplinary hearings until the time discipline is ordered. See id. app. A. NewJersey has recently joined the vast majority of
states that end the confidentiality ofjudicial ethics proceedings once a formal com-

plaint has been filed. See id.
22 427 U.S. 539
(1976).
M See id. at 542.
223
24

Id.
See id. at 545.
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In reviewing the gag order, the United States Supreme Court
considered the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage and its
potential to cause prejudice, whether less restrictive means could
serve to dull the prejudicial effect of unrestrained media coverage,
and how effectively a restraining order would actually work to prevent prejudice caused by media coverage. 5 The Court found that a
great potential for prejudice existed, but that the trial judge had not
made any findings that alternative means would not suffice to serve
the state's interest in preventing prejudice.2 6 The Supreme Court
noted that many alternate means could serve to deflect or diminish
any prejudice caused by media coverage, such as a change of venue,
delaying the proceedings until the media fervor has abated, a thoroughly searching voir dire of prospective jurors to screen out those
who had prejudged the defendant, use of emphatic jury instructions
regarding the jurors' need to base their decision solely on the evidence produced in court, and sequestration ofjurors.22 7 Finding that
no less restrictive alternatives had been considered, the Court invalidated the trial court's ruling as a constitutionally impermissible prior
restraint.22 8 Although the trial court's order was infirm due to the
failure to consider alternative means, the Court also noted that the
injunction ordered may not actually have been effectively tailored to
serve its own ends because in a very small rural community, word-ofmouth could be just as effective as the media in spreading the news
of what happened in an open court proceeding. Thus, a trial court
should not impose such a gag order; rather it should use the other
available means.2 The Court also questioned the enforceability of
such an order2 against
media outside of the territorial jurisdiction of
30
the trial court.

The Nebraska Press Court did not assess what possible means the
trial court would have to enforce its order in the event the media violated it. Presumably, the media would be held in contempt of court,
but the Supreme Court did not indicate that such a sanction could be
maintained against the media. Applying the FloridaStar standard, it is
clear that the trial judge would not be justified in imposing punish25
226

227
228

See id. at 546.
See id. at 565.
See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-65.
See id. at 565. The Court took great pains to point out that the Bill of Rights

does not place greater or lesser value on any one or another of its guarantees, such
that its ruling should not be taken as a pronouncement that First Amendment rights
necessarily trump Sixth Amendment rights. See id. at 570.
See id. at 567.
230

See id. at 568.
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ment on the press for publishing the truth. Conceivably, a court
could punish a violation of the order if the published information
was not lawfully obtained, although it would require twisted logic to
claim that information overheard as it was placed on the record in an
open public courtroom was somehow unlawfully obtained. It is
doubtful that maintaining the integrity of the court system and preserving the Sixth Amendment rights of an accused would qualify in
this scenario as state interests of the highest order sufficient under
the Florida Star framework to permit sanctioning the media, provided
that the trial court could produce a gag order sufficiently narrowly
tailored to serve its purposes. Nevertheless, application of the state
interest of the highest order doctrine to the issue of judicial gag orders would be wholly consistent with the Nebraska Press ruling. Indeed, the highest order doctrine would be an effective alternative test
to decide whether a gag order on speech overheard at a public trial
was constitutional.
Restrictions on media access to the courtroom are, in truth,
prior restraints on speech and should be recognized as such.23' Gag
orders, injunctions, imposing punishment or fines subsequent to
publication, denying media access to otherwise public material, or
otherwise impairing the media's ability to gather and report the news
are all restraints on speech that, but for the timing of the action, are
the functional equivalent of prior restraints.23 2 Even though prior restraints on speech have always been accorded the most exacting judicial scrutiny,23 there should be no semantic or jurisprudential differ-

ence between analysis of prior restraints on speech and governmental
efforts to sanction speech subsequent to its articulation or publication.234 The Supreme Court suggested as much in Daily Mail, stating:
"Whether we view the statutes as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive[,] because even the latter
action requires the highest form of
23 5
state interest to sustain its validity.,

Cf John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 419
(1983) (asserting that the doctrine of prior restraint "purports to assess the constitutionality of government action by distinguishing prior restraint from subsequent
punishment, but provides no coherent basis for making that categorization.")
See id. at 427-28 (noting that but for timing, injunctions preventing speech and
statutes punishing publication after the fact are alike).
25 See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559; South E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420
U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975).
234 See Gardner v. Bradenton Herald, Inc., 413 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 459
2

U.S. 865 (1982) (equating prior restraints and subsequent punishment on the media
as having the same effect and similarly offending the First Amendment).
235Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1979) (emphases added).
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Refusing to allow the media access to what otherwise would be
public proceedings is a punishment of the media. Such governmental action should be subject to the standards of the highest order doctrine.256 To justify impairing the media's ability to report the news
and thereby exercise its First Amendment right to freedom of the
press, a judge seeking to close a courtroom or to punish the media
for reporting the truth must be satisfied that such action is the only
way to advance a state interest of the highest order. The state interest
of the highest order doctrine could provide the single, unifying test
that is needed to rectify the increasingly fractured and erratic jurisprudence relating to media access to courtrooms and information relating to litigation.
VI. RECENT CASES DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR THE DOCTRINE TO
PROTECT SPEECH LIBERTIES AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION

Sadly, constitutional liberties have come under assault in courtrooms throughout the nation. As the preceding Part of this Article
suggests, courts are more and more frequently ready to impose restrictions on the speech rights of jurors, lawyers, litigants, and even
the media. Such a state of affairs has come to exist because the Supreme Court has failed to promulgate a consistent, unified standard
by which to assess governmental actions that impair the content of
individual expressive liberties. The plethora of Supreme Court
speech-related standards leads not to easy solutions when interests
clash, but to more confusion, as reviewing courts try to ascertain
whether a case should be analyzed under public forum principles,
strict scrutiny, balancing of interests, time, place, and manner rules,
or some other standard.
This Part of this Article will discuss several cases that have recently made their way through the courts or are still being litigated.
In each case, speech liberties were sacrificed to a competing governBut see Marin Indep. Journal v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 554 (Ct.App.
1993) (quoting Daily Mail language regarding the dearth of difference between
prior restraints and subsequent punishment, but finding that a trial court's confiscation of a news photographer's film negatives did not violate the First Amendment

because the photos were unlawfully obtained in deliberate violation of a court rule).
22% See State v. Globe Communications Corp., 622 So. 2d 1066,
1075 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). The court said:
It no longer makes any difference whether the restriction comes in the
form of an injunction or in the form of a penal "subsequent punishment" under federal or state decisional law. Both forms of restraint
are subject to careful review which requires the "highest form of state
interest to sustain (their] validity."
Id. (quoting Daily Mail 443 U.S. at 102) (alteration in original).
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mental interest, ranging from the compelling governmental interest
in preventing violence to the absurd governmental interest in protecting the emotional feelings of police officers. In each case, application of the state interest of the highest order doctrine would have
been the appropriate means of determining whether the sanction on
speech interests was constitutionally permissible. Yet, in each instance, the doctrine was ignored and the court either applied lesser
standards to determine whether the speech interests must yield to
governmental interests or failed seriously to consider the speech interests that were trammeled.
A.

Free Speech for Me, But Not for Thee

In a decision that alarmed many free speech advocates, who
viewed it as a content-influenced restriction on free speech,2 " a federal district court jury in Oregon in early 1999 assessed $107 million
in damages against the purveyors of "The Nuremberg Files," an antiabortion web site, in a rebuke of the group's strident anti-abortion

2,7 See NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME -

BUT NOT FOR THEE:
AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992).

How

THE

See Robyn E. Blumner, ACLU Backs Free Speech for All -

Except Pro-Lifers, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A22. Blumner, a former ACLU executive director for 10
years and former executive director of its Florida affiliate, decried the ACLU's support for the Oregon verdict, noting that it is inconsistent with the group's historical
advocacy of free speech for all regardless of the offensiveness of the message. See id.
For example, Blumner points out, the ACLU defended the rights of a neo-Nazi
group to march through the streets of the heavily Jewish town of Skokie, Illinois. See
id. Blumner points out that the founders of the web site, called "The Nuremberg
Files," were not on trial for perpetrating violence, but merely for their speech, which
the jury interpreted as provoking violence against abortion physicians. See id. The
author contends that the ACLU propagates a double standard when it comes to antiabortion speech and fails to stand up for the advocacy rights of pro-lifers. See id.; see
238

also Don Feder, Pro-lifers Denied First Amendment, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 1999, at 27.

But see Victoria Rivkin, Strategy and Old Ties Bring Abortion Case to Paul Weiss, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 4, 1999, at 1 (quoting Columbia University law professor and First Amendment
scholar Michael Dorf defending the jury's verdict and stating, "I don't see any logical
reason why [liability for incitement] should be confined to face-to-face communication"). See also Editorial, Tough Call: Anti-Abortion RulingDoesn't Appear Threat to Free
Speech, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5, 1999, at A34. The article suggested:
The ruling appears to be a narrow judgment about that context
[of the speech], the facts of this particular case and whether it indeed
crossed the line from just speech into actual threat, which does not enjoy the same constitutional protection.
The ruling is expected to be appealed. We hope, however, that it
stands as a reminder that political opposition is one thing, while violence and the threat and incitement of violence cross a serious line of
illegality for which there are appropriate consequences.
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messages.""' The verdict was premised on a theory that the inflammatory images and content of the web site provoked violence against
abortion physicians."O The plaintiffs sued under a federal statute
prohibiting violence that blocks access to abortion clinics.24 ' The defendants asserted a First Amendment defense, maintaining that their
"Wanted" posters - depicting abortion providers alongside graphic
images, including fetuses dripping with blood - were constitutionally protected free speech.242 The jury, however, found that the web
site's information could reasonably be construed as a "true threat" of
violence to abortion providers and thus fell within the incitement to
violence exception to the First Amendment's sphere of protection.4 3
The Oregon verdict resulted from an innovative interpretation
of a federal law safeguarding access to abortion clinics and banning
confrontational violence. The decision is as bizarre as it is innovative. The case, which produced no published opinion, does not appear to have been principally decided based on the Supreme Court's
incitement jurisprudence. Had the trial court applied the nowstandard test from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 44 it is highly likely that the
court would have determined that there was certainly adequate time
to rebut the inflammatory speech contained on the web site, thus
rendering the speech innocuous and constitutionally protected.
Beyond the incitement standard, since the plaintiffs were seeking to use the court to punish the defendants because of the content of
their speech, the court should have applied the state interest of the
239 SeeJury Finds Web Site Threatened Doctors Who Perform Abortions,
supra note 1.

240 See id. The information regarding the physicians
was presented in the form of
"Wanted" posters along with the names, home and work addresses, and personal information about the physicians. See id. The web site also allegedly crossed out the
name of a slain abortion physician within hours of his murder in his New York home

last

Yrear.

See id.

See id. The Planned Parenthood plaintiffs sued under the 1994 Federal Free-

dom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, which outlawed the use of "force or threat of
force" to attempt to impede access by patients or staff to abortion clinics. See id. According to the National Abortion Federation, violence at abortion clinics has produced seven killings, 15 attempted murders, 15 bombings, 101 acts of arson, and 45
attempted arsons or bombings since 1988. See id.
242 See id. The web site founders defended that the First
Amendment protected
their right to advocate against abortion and to agitate for political change on the legaliy of abortion. See id.
See Rivkin, supra note 238, at 1.
244 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The Brandenburgunanimous
opinion stands for the
proposition that all innocuous speech is protected by the First Amendment and all
speech is innocuous when there is time to rebut it. See id. Given the profligate
number of web sites on the Internet and the inevitable time lag between the time a
web visitor reads information and acts on that information, there is certainly always
time to rebut even the most inflammatory speech on the Internet.
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highest order doctrine to assess whether the speech at issue could be
subjected to punishment. If the court had determined that the web
site's materials were truly an incitement to imminent, fatal lawlessness, and thus were a threat to the peace, perhaps the state's interest
in preventing violence would qualify as a state interest of the highest
order. Saving an individual human life may not technically meet the
first standard of the state interest of the highest order doctrine - unless the life in question is one of such importance to the government,
such as the President, that his or her death would imperil the existence of the government itself. However, there is an argument to be
made that saving human life is perhaps the greatest good that the
state can achieve.2 45 Accordingly, punishing the web site's providers
may meet the first prong of the highest order doctrine. But given the
more than adequate time to rebut the inflammatory speech and the
fact that the Supreme Court has held Internet speech to be "pure
speech" worthy of the most strident First Amendment protection, 246 it

is doubtful that the damages award against the web site would meet
the no other alternative prong of the highest order doctrine.
B. ForeverHold Your Peace
In a case that has raised the ire of numerous journalists and media commentators,24 7 the United State Supreme Court denied certio245

See State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Public safety

and the protection of human life is a state interest of the highest order.").
246
See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (stating that "our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium").

247 See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 2, at 45
(calling the gag order issued in United
States v. Cleveland "highly unusual" and a "surreal solution" to a "real problem" and

arguing that the order is likely to produce "oddball" and "somewhat comical" results
such as elevating a trial judge to the level of "super-editor" who would review ques-

tions in advance before journalists may speak with jurors even after a case); Editorial, GaggingFormerJurors,THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 25, 1998, at 18A (arguing that there
is "no conflict" between the First Amendment right to free speech and the Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial posed by allowing the media to interview jurors once
a trial is over, and calling the Cleveland gag order "pointless" and a violation of the
free speech rights of both jurors and the media); Jane Kirtley, Keeping Jurors' Lips

Sealed, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 50 (arguing that jurors have a First
Amendment right to free speech that "doesn't vanish simply because they have
served on ajury" and that that right and the freedom of the press are endangered by
gag orders such as Judge Vance's); Wesley Pruden, When a Judge Abuses the Lady in
Blindfold, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1997, at A4 (characterizing as excessively controlling

and arrogant the efforts by judges to restrict access by reporters to jurors, especially
when the jurors are no longer engaged in deliberations); see also Gary Boulard, Limits on Juror Interviews, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 31, 1998, at 21 (noting that the

"Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and several other journalism organizations" filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Capital City's appeal to the Fifth
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rari in United States v. Cleveland,48 thus allowing to stand the affirmance by the Fifth Circuit of a district court judge's order that
barred jurors from discussing their deliberations with the media even
after the conclusion of the trial.24 9 The order, issued by United States
District Court Judge Sarah S. Vance has the effect of forbidding the
media -

in perpetuity -

from interviewing jurors regarding their

deliberations, absent a special order from the judge herself permitting the given questions to be asked. 5 °
The gag order challenged to the Supreme Court by Capital City
Press, publisher of the Baton Rouge Advocate, and Joe Gyan, a reporter
for the Advocate, was issued at the conclusion of the video poker racketeering and political corruption prosecution of two former Louisiana state senators and other defendants, a trial which attracted considerable local media attention. 5' Upon completion of the criminal
trial,jJudge Vance directed the jurors that "absent a special order by
me, no juror may be interviewed by anyone concerning the deliberations of the jury. 2 53 Capital City Press and Gyan challenged the
judge's order in the district court as a violation of their First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press and as unconstitutionally vague.2M The judge refused to modify
the gag order and the
255
newspaper appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
A Fifth Circuit panel upheld Judge Vance's restriction on juror
interviews as "an appropriate measure" needed to protect the secrecy
Circuit that stressed the public-information importance of post-verdict interviews
with jurors regarding deliberations).
2
118 S. Ct. 1518 (1998).
249 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th
Cir. 1997).
250 See id.
at 269.
251
See id. at 268. In addition to the public-figure defendants, the trial featured
testimony from witnesses including a former New Orleans archbishop and a former
governor of the state. See id.The trial attracted sustained media attention from its
inception and Judge Vance issued several verbal directives to jurors in the course of
the proceedings admonishing them not to speak with the media or anyone else
about the case and urging jurors to call her "day or night" if anyone approached
them about the case during their breaks. SeeJoe Gyan Jr., Gambling Tiial Nears Conclusion, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge),June 12, 1997, at 1A. Despite the case's high
profile in the media and the judge's articulated concerns regarding juror silence,
the 'ury was never sequestered during the course of the trial. See id.
2U See Cleveland, 128 F.3d at 268. The jury fully acquitted two of the defendants
and acquitted the remaining four on most charges and convicted them of one other.
See id. The jury reached its verdict after six weeks of testimony and eight days of deliberations. See id.
2
Id. at 269. The judge's order also instructed that "the lawyers and the parties
are not to attempt to question [urors] without an order from me." Id.
25 See id.
255

See id.
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of jury deliberations from the threat posed by post-verdict interviews.2 The court maintained that the order did not impair the media's ability to report on all proceedings that occurred in open court,
and only restricted information that was "not available to the public
at large. 25 7 The court said the gag order "was narrowly tailored to
prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice" and thus
justified any impairment of the media's First Amendment right to
gather the news. 2 8 The court also rejected the suggestion that the
order was unconstitutionally vague in that ordinary jurors would
most likely understand that "deliberations" encompassed only the
private discussions and debates that occurred in the jury room.
2
See id. at 270. Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Fifth Circuit Judge
DeMoss opined that "the possibility of post-verdict interviews" threatened the reliability of jury verdicts because it could discourage free speech within the jury room
if jurors feared their deliberations and opinions could later be revealed. See id.
Quoting the late United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo,
the court said that "'freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of
thought checked ifjurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to
be freely published to the world."' Id. (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13
(1933)).
27 Id. (citing United States v. Harrelson,
713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[M]embers of the press, in common with all others, are free to report whatever
takes place in open court but enjoy no special, First Amendment right of access to
matters not available to the public at large. The particulars ofjury deliberations fall
into the latter class .... ))
258 Cleveland, 128 F.3d at 270.
The Fifth Circuit applied its own precedents regarding restrictions on the media's access to information. See id. at 269-70
(discussing In reThe Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
a judge's order may not "restrict the journalistic right to gather news unless it is narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice")). In
Express-News, the Fifth Circuit reversed as overly restrictive a trial court's order that
forbade the media from interviewing "any juror, relative, friends or associates" of
jurors regarding the jury's deliberations or verdict absent permission of the court
and "good cause." See Express-News, 695 F.2d at 808. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the
court order as overly broad because it was unlimited in time and scope, applied to
all jurors regardless of their desire to be interviewed, forbade welcome as well as unwelcome questions, reached to all information regarding the jury's vote, including
general reactions, and implicitly encompassed jurors' conversations with their
friends and family as well as the media. See id. at 810. The court found that Judge
Vance's order was far more limited in scope since it applied only to the jurors themselves and restricted discussion only of the deliberations themselves, not of the verdict or general impressions of the case. See Cleveland, 128 F.3d at 269. The court
said the intense level of media interest in the case justified these restrictions on the
jurors' right to speak to the media. See id. The court said the judge's order still allowed jurors to make media comments regarding their general impressions of the
case and the verdict, and did not inhibit their willing comments to friends and family. See id. at 270.
See Cleveland, 128 F.3d at 271 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)) (finding that the void for vagueness doctrine requires definition "with sufficient definiteness [such] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is pro-
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2 6 the United
By declining certiorari in United States v. Cleveland,
States Supreme Court has allowed federal trial courts in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas to impose restrictions on the speech rights of
jurors and the media that are far more intrusive on expressive liberties, and are far less justified by governmental interest, than could
withstand the scrutiny applied in Florida Star or Boehner. Of course,
the press in Florida Star and the individuals in Boehner had already
lawfully obtained the information that the state tried to punish them
for disseminating, whereas the media in Cleveland was prevented from
obtaining the information it sought to publish in the first place.
Yet the gag order at issue begs the question of what order of
magnitude a governmental interest must meet to justify silencing individual speakers and the media. The Fifth Circuit in Cleveland said
only that absent the order, there was a "substantial threat" to the secrecy and reliability of jury deliberations and to the "administration
of justice.'
Does this "substantial threat" serve a substantial governmental interest, a compelling governmental interest, or a governmental interest of the highest order? The court did not address
the magnitude of the interest in protecting the administration ofjustice. One would not seriously dispute that the administration ofjustice is a compelling interest, yet it seems clear that there must come
some moment when the magnitude of that interest dissipates: when
the discussion of jury deliberations may not pose a "substantial
threat" to the justice system. Judge Vance's order was perpetual. Absent an order granting permission from the judge herself, the jurors
may neverbe interviewed regarding their deliberations.
The second standard of the state interest of the highest order
doctrine requires that there be no other means by which the state's
interest can be served. Imposing a blanket gag order on the entire
jury - restricting the speech rights of each juror as well as the public's right to know - and impairing the media's right to gather news
about truthful issues of consuming public interest are certainly not
the only ways to safeguard open free speech in ajury room. Such a
proposition is far too tenuous to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 62

hibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement").
118 S. Ct. 1518 (1998).
261 See Cleveland, 128 F.3d at 270.
2 In an editorial decrying the Cleveland gag order, The Tennessean
said of Judge
Vance's explanation, how "some future juror somewhere, somehow might be influ-

enced out of fear of a media interview stretches logic and defies justice." Editorial,
GaggingFormerJurors, supra note 247. The newspaper argued: "[T]o deny all interviews about deliberations after the trial is over infringes on the free speech rights of
both jurors and reporters. It also suppresses the public right to know." Id. The
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For example, the judge could order that jurors may speak only about
their own deliberations, but that the privacy of the jury room must be
preserved to the extent that they may not divulge the comments or
opinions of any other jurors. Thus, jurors who did not want their
opinions regarding the evidence or the trial to come to light would
have within their exclusive control the power to retain their privacy
by refusing to grant interviews. Jurors who did want to share with the
public and the media their thoughts and impressions regarding the
evidence, the witnesses, and their own decision-making processes
would have an absolute right to do so.
Judge Vance's order requires that any effort by such a juror to
grant an interview must be subject to the judge's personal editorial
discretion; thus, the media would virtually have to submit to the
judge each question and each answer from the jurors interviewed for
the judge to decide what answers may and may not be printed. Thus,
the order effectively transfers from the media to the judge - a government actor - the power of editorial discretion, a bizarre state of
affairs that is powerfully at odds with the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press.263
Court orders impairing media access to information regarding
trials require consideration of the full panoply of alternatives before
a restriction on speech may be applied.2 6 It is sheer judicial arrogance -

even lunacy -

to maintain that a judge can sit in judgment

of what questions the media may ask and, indeed, what members of
the media may interview a given person, and that such a power can
last forever, regardless of the remoteness of the trial. Taking Judge
Vance's order to its logical, though absurd, conclusion, a juror in a
newspaper argued that by allowing such gag orders to persist, the United States Supreme Court is impairing "public insight into trial[s]." See id.
2

See Alderman, supra note 2, at 45. Alderman, co-author with Caroline Ken-

nedy of In OurDefense: The Bill of Rights in Action and the Right to Privacy, wrote in the
Columbia Journalism Review that the gag order at issue in Cleveland reaches too far in
trying to resolve the problem of media over-saturation of trial coverage and the potential prejudice that may result. See id. The author acknowledged that a "trial as
spectacular entertainment has become so alarming that something must be done,"
but claims that from a reporter's perspective, 'Judge Vance's order falls into the

category of real problem, surreal solution." Id. Alderman theorizes that gag orders
such asJudge Vance's could lead to "oddball" results such as reporters having to run
inside the courthouse to ask the judge permission for each specific question that

they would like to address to a juror emerging from courthouse deliberations who
wants to speak about the jury's deliberations. See id. The author said the judge then

may "act as a super-editor," picking and choosing which questions may be asked and
which may not, and perhaps even discriminating among the various media outlets,
allowing some to interview jurors but refusing access to others. See id.
See generally United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

1999] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO FREEDOMOF SPEECH?

1263

high-profile case can be prohibited for life from discussing her
thoughts about the deliberations. Even the posthumous publication
of the juror's autobiography would violate the order unless the trial
judge had herself approved the publication. There is no jurisprudential basis for this constitutional anomaly of a judge sitting as a super-editor-in-chief. Judge Vance's ruling is clearly at odds with cases
that have applied the state interest of the highest order doctrine to
gag orders placed on jurors."
C. FloridaStarredux?
In two very odd recent cases that clearly fall within the protection of FloridaStar, trial judges meted out unduly harsh punishments
against reporters and the newspapers for which they work in fact scenarios remarkably similar to Florida Star. In each case, the newspapers were harshly punished for the publication of truthful information that they lawfully obtained. In each case, the rationale behind
the punishment was the same: A judge preferred that the newspapers not exercise their First Amendment right to publish the information.
In one case, Greenville, Mississippi, reporter CynthiaJeffries was
arrested and adjudged in criminal contempt for disobeying a judge's
order not to publish a criminal defendant's juvenile record - even
after the defendant's record was read aloud by a lawyer for the government in an open courtroom during sentencing.266 This case is starkly
reminiscent of the matter in dispute in Florida Star, when it was the
government's own carelessness that led to the wrongful disclosure to
the media of sensitive information. The media cannot be punished
for the government's failure to police itself adequately. Such is the
rationale behind the no other alternative prong of the state interest
of the highest order doctrine. The Mississippi judge's sanction
against the press for publishing truthful information that it lawfully
See, e.g., State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ind. 1990) (finding that news reporters may not be charged with contempt of court for soliciting information regarding grand jury deliberations from jurors two years after the proceedings had
ended absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order); State ex rel. National Broad. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1129
(Ohio 1990) (holding that the court may not, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order, prohibit a television station from airing names and photographs ofjurors when such information was available to anyone attending the trial);
Commonwealth v. Genovese, 487 A.2d 364, 368-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding
that a trial court's prohibition on the press's publication of the names ofjurors was
an impermissible prior restraint that did not serve a state interest of the highest order when the names were available to anyone attending the trial).
See Kirtley, supra note 3, at 24.
M
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obtained would certainly be found constitutionally invalid under the
state interest of the highest order doctrine. 67
The Mississippi contempt order against Jeffries was eventually
dismissed, but only after the State Attorney General asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to reverse her conviction on the grounds that
the presiding judge's order was unconstitutional and that the reporter was, therefore, correct to disobey it.269 If a reporter has to rely

on the state's highest prosecutor to defend her constitutional liberties, rather than on an independent judiciary, we have a constitutional anomaly rather than a reliable standard.
In the second case, the Wilmington Morning Star and its Raleigh,
North Carolina, bureau chief, Kirsten Mitchell, were not so fortunate
as to have an attorney general sensitive to civil liberties come to their
defense when a federal district judge fined them more than $600,000
for publishing the details of a settlement reached in a civil environmental pollution case of consuming local interest.

9

The litigants

agreed to keep the terms of the settlement agreement confidential,
but a court clerk erroneously gave the information to Mitchell in a
case file which should not have contained the settlement terms. 70
When Mitchell and the Morning Star exercised their First Amendment right to publish this truthful information that was lawfully, even
if erroneously, obtained from a court clerk, United States District
Court Judge Earl Britt held them in contempt and issued fines in excess of $500,000, and awarded 2$100,000 in attorneys' fees that the
Morning Starwas required to pay. 71
The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those of FloridaStar,
wherein a reporter was erroneously given truthful information - the
name of a rape victim that a sheriffs department should not have disseminated under the state statute. But because the government itself
was at fault, the United States Supreme Court determined that the
truthful information was lawfully obtained by the media and that the
267 Cf In re Hays v. Marano, 493 N.Y.S.2d 904,
906 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that
when a newspaper reported on a matter of public importance and obtained truthful
information, albeit inadvertently released, in a legal manner, the state could not im-

pose sanctions without a need to advance a state interest of the highest order).
268

2W

See Kirtley, supra note 3, at 25.

See Truitt, supra note 208. The newspaper was fined $500,000, ordered to pay

attorneys' fees of $100,000, and Mitchell herself was fined $1,000 and held in con-

temt of court. See id.
See id. The case involved an environmental pollution settlement after a federal
jury had found Conoco, Inc. negligent in cleaning up gasoline spills. See id. The
newspaper revealed that a $36 million settlement had been reached. See id.
271

See id. Mitchell and the newspaper were actually convicted of contempt in De-

cember 1997. See id.
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state had alternate means of enforcing its rape shield law, i.e., not
disseminating the sensitive information in the first place. The F/orida
Star Court reasoned that the First Amendment protected the media's
publication of the truthful information that it lawfully obtained absent a need to advance a state interest of the highest order, and, finding none, struck down the state's punishment of the media.
The North Carolina court's punishment of the Morning Star
would collapse under the F/orida Star standard. The federal district
court judge ignored F/orida Star in even attempting to punish the
media for publishing truthful information that it lawfully obtained
from a court clerk, especially given the fact that the government itself
had the power to prevent dissemination of the sensitive information
simply by policing its own files better. The obvious alternative means
for the government to ensure the confidentiality of settlement proceedings is to assure that its own court clerks do not hand over protected information to the media.
As FloridaStar pointed out, requiring the media to sift through
every document released to it and screen out any sensitive or objectionable materials would foster timidity and self-censorship among
the press, in direct contravention of the ideals embodied in the First
Amendment. That the fine imposed was so heavy and that attorneys'
fees were assessed as well makes this case all the more egregious.
How can the media engage in open, robust speech regarding public
issues when the content of its speech may expose it to six-figure liabilities? The newspaper and its bureau chief cannot constitutionally be
punished for publishing truthful information that they lawfully received absent a state interest of the highest order and no other
means to serve that interest. The Morning Star is contesting the fine" n
and should prevail if Florida Star is followed, but why should the
newspaper have to spend the time and money contesting a judge's
order that runs so clearly counter to Supreme Court precedent and is
so plainly offensive to the First Amendment?
D. A Gag on the Government
Usually, private actors and the media are the parties hurt by judicially enforced gag orders that restrict access to or publication of

2

See id The Morning Star is owned by The New York Times and Times assistant

general counsel George Freeman said, "This is a strange case, but we are confident
that the conviction will be overturned." Id. The Times appealed the ruling to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit's ruling was pending
at the time this Article went to press.
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information regarding trial proceedings.273 At times, however, it is
the government itself that feels stymied by a judge's order restricting
speech related to a trial, as was the situation with the Oklahoma City
bombing case, United States v. McVeigh.27 In that case, United States
District Court Judge Richard P. Matsch was widely hailed for ruling
his courtroom with an iron fist during the 1997 trials of Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, and for avoiding the media bedlam that
characterized the O.J. Simpson trial of the year before. 75 But
whereas some praised Matsch as the "anti-Ito '2 76 - a reference to
California Superior Court Judge Lance Ito, who presided over the
Simpson criminal trial - others have lamented a growing trend toward silencing participants in high-profile trials and restricting to
private quarters judicial proceedings that have traditionally been
held in public courtrooms. 277
2
See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail, 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); United States v.
Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1998).
274 157 F.3d 809 (10th
Cir. 1998).
275 See Judith Crosson, Trial Showed that the System Can Work, THE
HERALD
(Glasgow), June 3, 1997, at 10 ("The Oklahoma City bombing trial showed an increasingly skeptical American public that the justice system can move swiftly and
smoothly, especially when a no-nonsense judge is in charge."); Lou Kilzer & Kevin
Flynn, Verdict Still Out on Matsch's Handling of Trial, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 8, 1997, at 4A ("Judging by polls and instant analysis show that Denver U.S. DistrictJudge Richard Matsch has restored Americans' faith in their judicial system ....
Matsch was king of his court."); Gaylord Shaw, Victor in Trial: The Justice System,
NEWSDAY, June 15, 1997, at A3 ("The near-consensus among legal experts and commentators was that the way Matsch conducted the first Oklahoma City bombing trial
had helped rehabilitate the image of the American system ofjustice."); see also Editorial, Stop Gagging,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at A18 (praising Judge Matsch for his
"iron-hand" approach that prevented unauthorized leaks of information to the press
and public and contrasting his style to that of federal Judge Susan Webber Wright's
inability to control the myriad leaks that characterized PaulaJones's civil suit against
President Clinton). But see Kirtley, supra note 3, at 24 (faulting a "Simpson trial
backlash" and Judge Matsch's handling of the Oklahoma City Bombing cases for an
upsurge in gag orders and restrictive "no-nonsense" administrative procedures
adopted by trial judges).
See Crosson, supra note 275 (noting that lawyers in the McVeigh case referred
to Judge Matsch as the "anti-Ito" as a result of his heavy-handed control over the attorneys and witnesses involved in the case); see also Kirtley, supra note 3, at 24
("[M]any judges seem to have taken to chanting a new mantra: 'I will not be another Lance Ito. I will be another Richard Matsch."').
277 See Kilzer & Flynn, supra note 275 (quoting Oklahoma City
defense attorney
Garvin Issacs calling the trial "go-go justice, where everybody gets caught up in speed
and docket control, [that] has.., come at the expense of the citizen and a fair
trial"); Frank Santiago, Judges Follow Suit, Issue Gag Orders, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 3,
1998, at 1 ("Taking a cue from the Oklahoma City bombing case, federal judges are
handing down gag orders that bar lawyers from discussing their cases with the public
and media."); Shaw, supra note 275 (quoting media attorney Kelli Sager as saying
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Among those frustrated by Judge Matsch's heavy-handed control
over all participants in the case was, somewhat surprisingly, an Oklahoma District Attorney, who repeatedly petitioned the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado seeking termination of
Judge Matsch's gag order so that federal prosecutors and investigators might assist state officials with a state grand jury investigation of
the Oklahoma City bombing. 78 Oklahoma officials had to wait a year
from the June 1997 conclusion of the trial until Judge Matsch lifted
his gag order on attorneys,2 7 and another four months until the
Tenth Circuit affirmed that order. 80 While Oklahoma state prosecutors may have been somewhat inconvenienced in their duplicative,
and probably publicity-driven, attempt to mount a simultaneous
prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombing suspects, Judge Matsch's
orders had far more devastating implications for the media's right to
report issues of public concern and the public's right to observe and
comprehend judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, Judge Matsch's
heavy-handed treatment shows that even the government's interests
in openness and communication are sometimes impaired by
overzealous judges who impose restrictions on the content of speech.
Had Judge Matsch applied the standards of the state interest of
the highest order doctrine to analyze his own order, he would have
asked what possible governmental interest is being served by tying
the hands,, and gagging the mouths, of government prosecutors
months after the case had ended. If certain sensitive information
Judge Matsch "ran a hell of a trial," but that his secretive procedures and gag orders
were "frustrating and a disservice to the public"); Richard Willing & Kevin Johnson,
Effect of Oklahoma Trial Far Beyond Guilty Verdict, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 1A
("Oklahoma City may be remembered as the case in which press freedoms and defendants' rights clashed head on and press freedoms finished second.").
278 SeeMcVeigh, 157 F.3d at 812.
279 The judge's gag order stated:
A. None of the lawyers in this case or any persons associated with
them... will release or authorize the release of information or opinion about this criminal proceeding which a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by any means of public communication, if
there is a reasonable likelihood that such disclosure will interfere with
a fair trial of the pending charges or otherwise prejudice the due administration ofjustice.
B. This duty to refrain from prejudicial disclosures requires all counsel
to take reasonable precautions to prevent all persons who have been or
are now participants in or associated with the investigations conducted
by the prosecution and defense from making any statements or releasing any documents that are not in the public record and that are reasonably expected to be publicly disseminated which would be likely to
materially prejudice the fairness of this criminal proceeding.
United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756, 760 (D. Colo. 1996).
280 See McVeigh, 157
F.3d at 815.
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must be protected, could it not be protected in another manner,
rather than enforcing a blanket gag order on the prosecutors? A less
restrictive alternative is certainly available, safeguarding specific information and allowing communication on other issues. Thus, Judge
Matsch's order would not have passed even the traditional strict scrutiny test. The standards of the state interest of the highest order
would obviously not be met because of the existence of any alternative.
Judge Matsch was much praised as the antidote to Judge Ito, but
at what price? He ruled his courtroom with an iron fist, but he
trammeled individual liberty in so doing. Such overbroad restrictions on speech are not permitted under the First Amendment and
would likely be found invalid if subjected to the state interest of the
highest order doctrine.
E. A Bad Rapfor Free Speech
As the United States Supreme Court held in Aguilar and Butterworth, and as the federal district court demonstrated in Boehner, the
state interest of the highest order doctrine and the holding of Florida
Star are equally applicable to individuals whom the government attempts to punish for exercising constitutionally protected liberties as
they are to the media." " Given that fact, what does one make of the
constitutionally aberrant arrest last year of Shawn Thomas, a California rap artist who was jailed due to the controversial nature of his lyrics?28 2

Thomas, who performs under the name C-Bo,2s was taken

from his home and confined in the Sacramento County Jail after
California Corrections Department officials determined that the lyrics on his latest album, Til My Casket Drops, advocate violence against
police and "promote [I the gang lifestyle. '084 Among Thomas's alleg28
See Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV. 98-594, 1998 WL 436897 (D.D.C. July 28,
1998); see also supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the

Boehner opinion).
2
See Baker, supra note 6 ("California rapper Shawn Thomas... appears to be
the first musician arrested for what he said on a record.").
C-Bo is meant as an abbreviation of "Cowboy." See id.
C8
2
See Baker, supra note 6. Thomas was arrested on March 3, 1998, at his home.
See id. California Department of Corrections Assistant Director of Communications
Tipton Kindel issued his own review of C-Bo's album, stating,

There are 17 songs on the album, and each one promotes the gang
lifestyle, criminal behavior and violence against law-enforcement officers, public officials and parole agents ....After reviewing the lyrics
and the entire file, it was considered that he was actually more of a
danger to leave on the street, so it was decided to arrest him.
Id. Thomas's attorneys filed three appeals of his parole terms with the California

1999] WHATEVER HAPPENED TO FREEDOM OFSPEECH?

1269

edly incendiary lyrics was a song that railed against then California
Governor Pete Wilson for signing the state's "three strikes, you're
out" law, under which minor violations such as shoplifting can land a
repeat offender in jail for 50 years to life." 5 State officials justified
this egregious impairment of Thomas's free speech and liberty interests as necessary to enforce the conditions of Thomas's parole for an
earlier minor weapons-related incident.28 6 Thomas's parole was subject to some very highly suspect conditions that implicate central First
Amendment interests: He was told that he could not promote, i.e.,
sing about, violence against police officers, promote the "gang lifestyle," or "threaten" any public officials or he would find himself incarcerated.
Department of Corrections, the maximum allowed. See id. Each appeal was rejected. See id.
28 See Chris Vognar, Rapper's Parole Violation Raises Free-Speech
Issues, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 11, 1998, at 1C. In the song "Deadly Game," C-Bo exclaims,
"You better swing batter, batter swing/'cause once you get your third felony 50 years
you gotta bring/It's a deadly game of baseball, so when they try to pull you
over/shoot 'em in the face y'all." Id. C-Bo's album also included a song naming the
local sheriff by name and stating, "'They'll be gunnin' down Cooper 'cuz he want to
send all niggers to the pen."' Sharon Waxman, Paroled Rapper's War of Words, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at D-2. C-Bo's Casket album debuted on Billboard magazine's
rhythm and blues chart at number ten and on the pop album chart at number 41 in
the week it was released. See Shawnee Smith, The Rhythm & The Blues, BILLBOARD,
Dec. 26, 1998.
286 See Baker, supra note 6. Thomas was arrested in 1993 after
he fired a gun in
the air during a video shoot in Sacramento, California. See id. Thomas's shot did
not hit or injure anyone, but afterward another person on the set fired a gun and
killed a man. See id. Although he was not implicated in the killing, Thomas was
eventually prosecuted for recklessly firing a weapon and was sentenced to four years,
15 months of which he served before he was released on parole. See id.
287 See Baker, supra note 6. Among the conditions of
his parole, Thomas was ordered not to "engage in any behavior which promotes the gang lifestyle, criminal
behavior and/or violence against law enforcement." Id. Police arrested him for
"[t]raveling too far from home, failing to tell his parole office about traffic tickets... and rapping about the wrong things on his recent album .... " according to
one commentator. Vognar, supra note 285. The California Board of Prison Terms
eventually decided to drop the charges against Thomas stemming from his song lyrics, the sole reason for his arrest, yet he was kept in jail for 30 days because of the
additional parole violations. See Steve Hochman, Charges Against Rapper over Lyrics
Dropped, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A-15. Before Thomas was due to be released
from prison on the remaining parole violations, however, he tested positive for marijuana use and was sentenced to an additional 90 days in jail. See Anita M. Samuels,
C-Bo Gets 90 More Days for Drug Use, BILLBOARD, Mar. 28, 1998. Several months after
his arrest in Sacramento, Thomas was back in court in Cincinnati, where he rapped
a few lines for the judge in order to beat a rap on an unrelated drug and gun charge
that occurred in Cincinnati in 1996. See Tanya Albert, "Hearingis Believing. Why Don't
You Give Me a Selection?" Rapper Sings for his Freedom on Gun, Drug Charges, CIN.
ENQUIRER, July 29, 1998, at B-1. To demonstrate that he no longer advocated the
gang lifestyle, Thomas, at the judge's request, broke into song in the courtroom,
rapping: "We don't commit crimes/We spit rhymes... Livin' life in hell hard for a
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Thomas's parole conditions are constitutionally suspect in and
of themselves, since they violate the doctrine against unconstitutional
conditions,2' are unconstitutionally vague,2 89 and clearly contradict
First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the state's ability to interfere with the advocacy of illegal conduct only when the speech presents a danger of "imminent lawless action" and where there is insufficient time to rebut the speech and thereby avoid the danger.
A
young black male./Crime only pays the time you're doing in jail ... You'll never see
better days/runnin' around thinkin' that crime pays." Id. After listening approvingly to C-Bo's new, law enforcement-friendly rap and placing Thomas on parole until the year 2000, Judge Melba D. Marsh of the Hamilton County Common Pleas
Court warned the rapper not to sing any more lyrics critical of law enforcement,
adding, "If I hear something I don't like, you'll be back here." Id.
288 See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 10-8, at 681; Darragh Johnson, A Rap Album,
an Arrest - and a Debate over Free Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 5, 1998, at D1 (quoting Los
Angeles First Amendment attorney Douglas Mirell as stating, "You cannot tell people
not to exercise their First Amendment rights as a condition of being let out of jail.
That's flabbergasting."). But see id. (quoting University of California at Berkeley constitutional law Professor Jesse Choper as stating that parolees sacrifice many of their
constitutional rights, including the rights to vote, to bear arms, and to be free from
warrantless searches and seizures, in exchange for being let out ofjail).
289 See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 10-8, at 684 (explaining the void
for vagueness doctrine as a protection of due process interests). The precise definition of Thomas's
parole condition prohibiting him from "promoting" a gang lifestyle leaves open the
interpretation of the term "promote." The fact that local officials felt that C-Bo's
lyrics protesting the state's "three strikes" law and encouraging violent resistance to
the police demonstrates the inherently vague nature of the parole terms. Some have
argued that rap musicians, who are predominantly African-American, face a double
standard that is rooted in racism such that government officials are quicker to label
their protest songs as illegal advocacy of crimes than they would the protest songs of
white artists, such as folk musicians of the 1960s and 1970s who advocated resistance
to authority. See Vognar, supra note 285. Noting that protest artists including Bruce
Springsteen, whose Nebraska album included tales of impulsive murderers and corrupt cops, are hailed by critics, the public, and even, in Sprinsgteen's case, American
presidents, Vognar asks why hip-hop musicians always get a bad rap for their angry
protestations of society's inequities: "[W]hy categorize one type of music as a literal
call to arms, and another as poetic expression?... [W]hy do we cheer when Arnold
Schwarzenegger's Terminator wipes out an entire police station, but blanch when
Ice-T writes a song called 'Cop Killer?"' Id. Vognar concludes that racism may be at
the root of such a double standard: "Rap is held to a different set of standards than
other forms of artistic expression, and a big reason is a fear of the unknown - in
this case, young black rappers and their chosen medium for expressing anger that hip-hop represents to the generally white establishment." Id.
2W
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The unanimous Brandenburg Court held that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.
Id. California's punishment of C-Bo's lyrics is akin to Ohio's punishment of the Ku
Klux Klan members prosecuted in Brandenburgin that the state "purports to punish
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record album released for public consumption in the privacy of one's
home or automobile, broadcast on public airwaves, or played at
nightclubs or in concert halls is clearly not the type of "advocacy" of
"imminent lawlessness" that justifies impairment because there is certainly adequate opportunity for rebuttal of such speech.'9
Beyond the highly suspect nature of the terms placed on Thomas's parole, his subsequent punishment for voicing his opinions is
an unforgivable assault on the First Amendment. While C-Bo's lyrics
may be offensive to some, they are surely constitutionally protected
speech, particularly the most objectionable of his songs, which represents his frustration with the state's harsh "three strikes" law.9 2 When
such political speech and advocacy of resistance to unjust, or even
just, laws results in the speaker being hauled from his home and
thrust into jail, the First Amendment has been assaulted in a manner
that should incite the indignation of all Americans regardless of their
opinions of C-Bo's lyrics in particular or rap music in general.
Holding the actions of the California Corrections Department to
the standards of the state interest of the highest order doctrine, it is
untenable to maintain that Thomas's arrest could be warranted. CBo's lyrics are obviously his own opinion on an issue of public importance, and in the realm of First Amendment analysis, there is no such
thing as a false idea.' Accordingly, Thomas's expression is "truthful"
information within the meaning of FloridaStar.94 His songs qualify as
a "publication" of that truthful information.2 5 Thus, the state may
not punish Thomas's expression absent a state interest of the highest
order that is not otherwise servable by any other means. What interest is being served by his arrest that could not be better served by
educating the public against gang activity in order to counteract CBo's incendiary lyrics?9 6 Is protecting the feelings and comfort of the
the mere advocacy and to forbid, upon pain of criminal punishment, assembly with
others merely to advocate the described type of action." Id. at 449. As the Brandenburg Court held, such state punishment of advocacy "falls within the condemnation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
29
See id. at 447 (holding that all innocuous speech is constitutionally protected,
and all speech is innocuous when there is time to rebut it).
See Baker, supra note 6 (quoting Thomas's attorney as saying, "This is the parole board getting into the content of his music. His music has a political message,
and it's a political message that they don't like.").
m9 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.").
2% Presumably, Thomas "truthfully" conveyed his own
thoughts regarding the
wisdom of California's "three strikes" law.
29
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 n.18 (1978) (noting that spoken words
are a publication for purposes of slander and for First Amendment analysis).
2
Interestingly, California parole administrator Henry Peralta characterized
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police in the guise of discouraging songs about gang activity a state
interest of the highest order, such that the state's continued existence would be at risk from a failure to sanction this rapper from
rhyming in a way that suggests resistance to the police? Can such an
interest ever justify preventing a person from speaking his mind7
when there is time to rebut the offensive speech with more speech?2
C-Bo's sanction is akin to the fine against "The Nuremberg
Files." Speaking about gang violence does not, ipso facto, cause gang
violence. As Justice William 0. Douglas argued in his powerful dissent in Dennis v. United States,28 the state may outlaw harmful activities
such as bomb-making or violent overthrow of the government, but it
may not outlaw teaching about groups that advocate such activities.2
That spirit was echoed from a justice of a different ideological bent
recently, as Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in the Court's unanimous opinion in KA. V v. St. Pauim that murder can be sanctioned
by the state, but speaking about murder cannot be."' Protecting police officers from unkind rap songs hardly rises to the level of a state
interest of the highest order. Speaking about violence is only sanctionable when it is an incitement to likely imminent lawlessness. As
with the web site, communication via a rap song that one listens to at
home is certainly subject to ample time to rebut. Additionally, there
are alternative means to serve the state's interest in combating Thomas's involvement with gang violence, such as restricting his parole
such that he may not engage in actual involvement with gang violence or he will be forced to return to jail.02 Sanctioning the rap artThomas's arrest as the state's effort to protect Thomas from himself stating: "When
it comes to a parolee, we have the responsibility to try to keep them from participatingin the behavior that got them into trouble." See Baker, supra note 6.
See supra note 290 (discussing the constitutional standard stemming from
Brandenburgv. Ohio).
"8

341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Justice wrote:

The opinion of the Court does not outlaw [Communist] texts nor

condemn them to the fire, as the Communists do literature offensive
to their creed. But if the books themselves are not outlawed, if they
can lawfully remain on library shelves, by what reasoning does their use

in a classroom become a crime? It would not be a crime under the Act
to introduce these books to a class, though that would be teaching

what the creed of violent overthrow of the Government is.
Id.

Mo 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
301
M2

See id. at 387-88.
See Baker, supra note 6. Baker quotes Ann Brock, staff attorney for the ACLU

of Northern California, stating that Thomas "[i]s not being punished for anything
he did. He is being punished for using music as a means of expressing his political
views. The state is trying to put him in jail because they don't like what he said." Id.
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ist for what he says rather than for what he does is judicial arrogance
nonpareil, is patently offensive to the First Amendment, and could
never have come about had the state interest of the highest order
doctrine been applied.
F. Judges versus The FirstAmendment
The First Amendment should be read to compel all government
actors, including members of the judiciary, to address the state interest of the highest order standard before impairing the content of free
speech liberties; the government did not do so in any of the cases recounted thus far in this Part of this Article. In no case would the
court-imposed restrictions survive the application of the doctrine.
Judges are expected to be vigilant in scrutinizing the proper limits of
governmental authority,"" irrespective of how popular the government's behavior may be, and they should be loath to issue gag orders
and other restrictions on the speech of persons brought before or
watching them. Such orders must be justified by a need to further a
state interest of the highest order addressable by no other alternative
means.
Gag orders frequently do not serve their own purposes and can
result in the dissemination of less reliable information to the press
and public and less accountability for it." As many courts have recognized, properly managing information flow can be more successful
than imposing blanket restrictions; alternative proceedings work far
better to secure the fair administration ofjustice than do gag orders.
Delaying the dates of trials and changing venues serve to diminish
the potential for prejudice caused by excessive pretrial publicity in
notorious cases. Thorough voir dire, comprehensive instructions to
all attorneys and parties regarding out-of-court statements, and, if
need be, sequestering the jury, can all serve the interests of preventing prejudicial publication of sensitive, nonpublic, trial-related information. And once a trial is concluded, restricting juror comments
to voluntary statements regarding their own impressions of the trial
that do not reveal the identities of any other jurors adequately serves
any concerns regarding protecting open, robust communication in
30s

See LAURENcE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 80 (1990)

("The

whole point of an independent judiciary is to be "antidemocratic," to preserve from
transient majorities those human rights and other principles to which our legal and
political system is committed." (emphasis in original)).
See Editorial, Stop Gagging, supra note 275 (arguing that the Office of the Independent Counsel's criminal investigation of President Clinton resulted in myriad
leaks of non-attributed information to the press and worked against the goal of assuring a fair resolution of the disputes).
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the jury room. When judges cause courtrooms to be closed, thus
shutting the public out, they do violence to the First Amendment liberties of all.s 5
There are some bright spots on the constitutional horizon
where justices of courts of last resort have restrained trial judges and
given due regard to constitutional rights to access to information regarding public judicial proceedings. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court recently rebuked two trial judges who closed
pretrial hearings in a high-profile criminal case for failing to explore
less restrictive alternatives that would still protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial before ordering the proceedings closed.3 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court also struck down a policy that denied
all access to court records related to child molestation cases - even
when information identifying the victim had been purged from the
records. 7 That court rightly found such a broad ban on access to be
violative of the First Amendment-protected right of access to criminal
proceedings because such a ban was not narrowly tailored and was
too restrictive.

See Kirtley, supra note 3, at 24. The author vigorously criticized President Clinton's attorneys in the Paula Jones civil suit for arguing that United States District
Court Judge Susan Webber Wright should reconsider her order unsealing many of
the records in the case. See id. Kirtley said that Clinton, a former professor of constitutional law, and his lawyers were demonizing the exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment liberties in their effort to protect the President from embarrassment. See id. The author stated: "One might have hoped that the president
of the United States would have suggested to his lawyers that this argument might be
a tad overwrought, implying as it does that exercising constitutionally protected
guarantees of free speech and press for monetary gain are somehow improper, ignoble and inappropriate." Id. Kirtley, the executive director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, characterized President Clinton's anti-media,
pro-suppression argument as follows:
[T]he news media are in the business to make money. They have a lot
of time and space to fill, and no significant international crisis to
cover. They learned during the debacle that was the O.J. Simpson
criminal trial that the public has an insatiable desire to watch and read
about sensational court cases. Therefore, left to their own devices they
will pluck the most salacious details out of any court case, will repeat
them over and over again, and [will] haul in endless pundits to ponder
what it all means. This not only will be embarrassing for the hapless
litigants, but it will distort and degrade the judicial system itself. They
must be stopped, at all costs.
Id.
35

*0 See id.

307

See id.

308 See id.
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But the media should not be forced to litigate for the privilege
of exercising rights they indisputably possess.* Why should either of
these cases have had to make it to their states' highest court before
the media was able to vindicate the constitutional rights that were
guaranteed through landmark cases decades ago?310 Why should the
media or individual defendants have to bear the cost of litigating
their cases to the highest court of a state - or of the land - when
the Constitution and the controlling case law are so clearly already
on their side? Why should not state and federal trial judges - who
are on the front lines of First Amendment cases - have a constitutional, jurisprudential, recognized, and acknowledged predisposition
in favor of openness to the media?31' The United States Supreme
Court should send a strong message to lower courts that they are
bound by the clear precedent of cases such as Florida Star. Rather
than denying certiorari and allowing to stand lower court orders that
are so obviously at odds with First Amendment jurisprudence, the
Court -

the last resort for protection of our liberties

-

should re-

mand offensive cases with a one sentence direction that they be decided in accordance with the controlling precedent."' 2 Thus can the
United States Supreme Court assure that expressive liberties are protected without the expense of ancillary litigation within the underlying case, and without delay.
1(

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court fashioned the state interest of
the highest order doctrine in order to synthesize and simplify the vaSee Kotlikoffv. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 67-68, 444 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1982)
(holding that courts should scrutinize the vitality of cases involving the First
Amendment in the earliest stage of the case because the media should not be compelled to pay the expense of frivolous or baseless litigation as a pre-condition to the
exercise of its First Amendment-protected newsgathering rights).
310 See Kirtley, supra note 3, at 25 ("[T] hese victories are bittersweet, because they
involve situations where the law vindicating the journalists' arguments was already
well-established, but ignored by the trial judges involved.... [I]t is disheartening to
realize that again and again judges must be re-educated to uphold access rights.");
see also generally Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
31
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ...."). How can there
be open, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues when the media is stifled?
Mp See, e.g.,
Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712, 713 (Pa. 1991) (Boettger II)
(complying on remand with the United States Supreme Court's explicit direction
that the court decide a media liability case in accordance with the rule of Florida
Star); Easton Publ'g Co. v. Boettger, 493 U.S. 885, 885 (1989) (remanding the case
with a one sentence direction that it be decided under FloridaStar).
3W
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riety of First Amendment standards and to provide an elevated level
of scrutiny for governmental acts that impair the content of the exercise of expressive liberties. The state interest of the highest order
doctrine has been applied to grant strident protection to the media
and to individuals in a narrow category of cases wherein state actors
in any of the three branches of government attempted to punish the
publication of lawfully obtained truthful information.
There is no justification for restricting the application of the
doctrine to media defendants or to cases that are factually on point
with Daily Mail and FloridaStar. As ChiefJustice Burger articulated in
Yoder, as Justice Marshall provided in FloridaStar, and as Chief Justice
Rehnquist demonstrated in Aguilar and Butterworth, the state interest
of the highest order doctrine is applicable to provide due process
protection to a diversity of First Amendment liberty interests that
could be impaired by governmental action. Indeed, this heightened
protection of constitutional liberties should translate into greater
scrutiny of governmental actions whenever they impair the content of
expressive rights such as religious exercise and freedom of speech.
The doctrine of state interest of the highest order - which
means that the government may curtail the content of expressive liberties only when the interests that the government seeks to serve must
be served at the peril of the demise of the government itself if they go
unserved and only where the government's interest in selfpreservation can be served by no other means - offers a consistent,
predictable, unifying standard that puts the constitutionally mandated, appropriately burdensome, sine qua non onus of justifying
state impairment of expressive liberties on the branch of the government that seeks the impairment. Courts should turn to the state
interest of the highest order doctrine whenever a government act in any branch and at any level of the government - implicates the
content of First Amendment interests, and courts should put the government to the task of justifying its repressive actions as absolutely necessary for the survival of the state. Consistent application of the state
interest of the highest order doctrine would grant all Americans the
comforting guarantee that their expressive liberties are immune from
unjustified interference and would assure that the First Amendment
remains the crown jewel of our constitutional democracy.

